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Commentators idealize a racially fair criminal justice system as one without 
racial animus. But unjustified racial disparities would persist even if racial 
animus disappeared overnight. In this Article, we introduce the concept of 
implicit white favoritism into criminal law and procedure scholarship, and 
explain why preferential treatment of white Americans helps drive the stark 
disparities that define America’s criminal justice system. Scholarly efforts 
thus far have shone considerable light on how unconscious negative 
stereotyping of black Americans as hostile, violent, and prone to criminality 
occurs at critical points in the criminal justice process. We rotate the 
flashlight to reveal implicit favoritism, a rich and diverse set of automatic 
associations of positive stereotypes and attitudes with white Americans. 
White favoritism can operate in a range of powerful ways that can be 
distinguished from traditional race-focused examples: in the way, for 
example, white drivers are pulled over less often than unseen drivers or 
crimes against white victims are seen as more aggravating. Our account of 
implicit white favoritism both enriches existing accounts of how implicit 
racial bias corrupts the criminal justice system and provides explanations 
for disparities that implicit negative stereotyping explanations miss 
altogether. 
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Commentators idealize a racially fair criminal justice system as one 
without racial animus. But unjustified racial disparities would persist even if 
derogation disappeared overnight. In this Article, we introduce the concept 
of implicit white favoritism into criminal law and procedure scholarship, 
and explain why preferential treatment of white Americans helps drive the 
stark disparities that define America’s criminal justice system.1  
 
Our project is part of the larger scholarly effort over the past decade to 
draw on an extensive body of social science that demonstrates how 
individual actors in the criminal justice system—and in society generally— 
possess implicit racial biases that can affect their perceptions, judgments, 
and behaviors.2 Criminal law scholars have employed implicit bias-based 
                                                
1 Racial disparities pervade the American criminal justice system. Commentators 
almost universally agree on this fact. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (2010) [hereinafter 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW] (“The fact that more than half of the young black men 
in many large American cities are currently under the control of the criminal justice system 
(or saddled with criminal records) is not—as many argue—just a symptom of poverty or 
poor choices, but rather evidence of a new racial caste system at work.”); Ian F. Haney 
Lo´pez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2010) [hereinafter Lo´pez, Post-Racial Racism] 
(“Even the most cursory engagement with American criminal justice at the start of the 
twenty-first century drives home the twin points that the United States puts people under 
the control of the correctional system at an anomalously high rate, and that it shuts behind 
bars an overwhelmingly disproportionate number of black and brown persons.”). 
2 On implicit bias in the law generally, see IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 
(Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds. 2012). See also Anthony G. Greenwald & 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 966 
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analyses to help explain racial discrepancies in police stop-and-frisk rates,3 
arrest rates,4 prosecutorial charging and bargaining,5 sentencing,6 and other 
areas where disparities persist.7 These scholars have, project by project, 
                                                                                                                       
(2006) (“[I]mplicit race bias is pervasive and is associated with discrimination against 
African Americans.”); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(2005); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010); Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
945 (2006); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, 
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & 
Danielle Young, Guilt by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association 
Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187 (2010) [hereinafter Levinson et. al. Guilt by Implicit Bias]; 
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. 
CT. REV. 153 (claiming that the Supreme Court’s consent jurisprudence should include 
findings from the psychology of compliance). 
3 L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L. REV. 
1143, 1145 (2012) (arguing that “[i]mplicit social cognition research demonstrates that 
implicit biases can affect whether police interpret an individual’s ambiguous behaviors as 
suspicious”); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267 (2012); Josephine Ross, Can Social Science Defeat a 
Legal Fiction? Challenging Unlawful Stops Under the Fourth Amendment, 18 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315 (2012). 
4 Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 G.W. L. REV. 157, 164-65 
(2013) (examining police behavior and implicit bias specifically in the context of drug 
arrests); Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 3 (claiming that “implicit social 
cognition … can contribute much to the understanding of police behavior…”). See also 
Robert D. Crutchfield, Warranted Disparity? Questioning the Justification of Racial 
Disparity in Criminal Justice Processing, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 20 (2004) 
(examining the extent to which racial differentials in arrests actually represent crime 
involvement given the potential bias in some jurisdictions); Mary N. Bowman, Full 
Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, and Search Warrant Scrutiny (2013), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/mary_bowman/2. 
5 Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012).  
6 See, e.g., Jerry Kang et. al, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1125 
(2012); Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith & Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: An 
Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty 
States, __ NYU L. REV. __ (forthcoming, 2014); Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Capital 
Punishment: Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith 
(eds.), IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 229 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release 
Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 
41 CRIMINOLOGY 873, 898 (2003) (finding that Hispanic defendants are more likely to be 
detained than white and black defendants, and racial/ethnic differences are most 
pronounced in drug cases); Marvin D. Free, Jr., Racial Bias and the American Criminal 
Justice System: Race and Presentencing Revisited, 10 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 195, 220 
(2002) (finding evidence of discrimination in key criminal justice decision points); Andrea 
D. Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755 (2012); L. Song Richardson & Philip A. Goff, Implicit Racial 
Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L. J. 100 (2013) (examining implicit racial bias 
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demonstrated that implicit negative stereotypes of black Americans pervade 
the American psyche. For example, Americans rate ambiguous pieces of 
evidence to be more probative of guilt when a suspect is dark-skinned and 
display a stronger implicit connection between “black” and the concept 
“guilty” than they do between “white” and “guilty.”8 The overriding theme 
in this work is that implicit negative stereotypes of black Americans as 
hostile, violent and prone to criminality create a lens through which 
criminal justice actors automatically perpetuate inequality.  
 
This picture is incomplete. Even if we could eliminate the bias that these 
scholars have illuminated, racial disparities would persist. To gain a fuller 
understanding of what drives unjustified disparities, we must rotate the 
flashlight ever so slightly to reveal a rich and diverse form of implicit racial 
bias that has been overlooked in criminal law and procedure research. This 
is the bias of implicit favoritism. Implicit favoritism can be defined as the 
automatic association of positive stereotypes and attitudes with members of 
a favored group, leading to preferential treatment for persons of that group.9 
In the context of the American criminal justice system, implicit favoritism 
is white favoritism. Consider a police officer deciding whether to stop a 
vehicle. The favoritism question is not whether the officer is less likely to 
pull over a white driver than a black driver, but rather if the officer is less 
likely to pull over a vehicle when she sees a white driver than when she is 
entirely unaware of the driver’s race.  
 
In this Article, we explain that implicit favoritism is important because 
it helps to drive racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Social 
scientists have linked implicit favoritism to the ability of jurors to remember 
accurately damning details of an alleged offense,10 to the evaluation of 
whether negative actions taken by another are the result of one’s disposition 
                                                                                                                       
in the context of the public defender’s office); Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial 
Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 879, 898–99 (2009) (finding that being under the control of the criminal justice 
system increased the odds of pretrial detention for blacks but not for whites). 
8 Levinson et. al., Guilt by Implicit Bias, supra note 8 (2010); Justin D. Levinson  & 
Danielle Young: Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments 
of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 307 (2010).  
9 See e.g. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Ingroup Experts and Peers as Social Vaccines Who 
Inoculate the Self-Concept: The Stereotype Inoculation Model, 22 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
INQUIRY 231 (2011); Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup 
Favoritism, and their Behavioral Manifestations, SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, 17, 143-169 
(2004). 
10 See infra nn. but see, especially, Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8, 
at 354. 
25-Jan-14] IMPLICIT WHITE FAVORITISM (DRAFT) 5 
or instead to the circumstances that constrained one’s choices,11 and to the 
degree of empathic response to human pain.12 Implicit white favoritism has 
serious ramification for criminal law and procedure because it can operate 
in a range of powerful ways that can be distinguished from traditional race-
focused examples: in the way, for example, white drivers are pulled over 
less often than unseen drivers, in the way legislators see white “meth” 
addicts as suffering from an illness and black “crack” addicts as criminals, 
and in the way prosecutors and jurors view a crime as more aggravated if 
the victim is white or see a white juvenile offender to be more capable of 
redemption.13 
 
Our account of implicit white favoritism both enriches existing accounts 
of how implicit racial bias corrupts the criminal justice system and provides 
explanations for disparities that implicit negative stereotyping explanations 
miss altogether. It proceeds in three parts:  
 
Part I introduces implicit racial bias and explains how scholars have 
relied on this social science concept to help explain a range of disparities in 
the criminal justice system. Despite the importance of the broad model we 
outline in Part I, we nonetheless conclude that the failure of scholarship to 
account for implicit favoritism leaves a significant gap in our understanding 
of why racial disparities persist in the criminal justice system. 
 
                                                
11 See infra nn. But see, especially, Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution 
Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1979); Miles Hewstone, The ‘Ultimate Attribution Error’: A Review 
of the Literature on Intergroup Causal Attribution, 20 EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 
(1990); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore 
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L.J. 1, 1 (2005); Tracie 
L. Stewart et al., Consider the Situation: Reducing Automatic Stereotyping Through 
Situational Attribution Training, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 221 (2010). 
12 See infra nn. But see, especially, Jennifer N. Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Intergroup 
Differences in the Sharing of Emotive States: Neural Evidence of an Empathy Gap, 20 
SCAN 596, 596 (2011) (finding an in-group bias in empathy); B.K. Cheon et al., Cultural 
Influences on Neural Basis of Intergroup Empathy 57 NEUROIMAGE 642 (2011); Matteo 
Forgiarini et al., Racism and the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, 2 FRONTIERS IN PSYCOL. 1 
(2011); C. Lamm et al., How Do We Empathize with Someone Who is Not Like Us? A 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 22 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 362 (2010); 
V.A Mathur et al., Neural Basis of Extraordinary Empathy and Altruistic Motivation, 51 
NEUROIMAGE 1468 (2010); Pascal Molenberghs, The Neuroscience of In-Group Bias, 37 
NEUROSCIENCE AND BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1530 (2013); S. D. Preston & F. B. M. de Waal, 
Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 1 (2001); Xiaojing Xu 
et al., Do You Feel My Pain? Racial Group Membership Modulates Empathic Neural 
Responses, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8525 (2009). 
13 See infra Part III. 
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Part II begins to address that gap. In this Part, we introduce the social 
science of implicit favoritism. We begin by exploring how priming positive 
racial stereotypes—or privileged racial group membership—leads to a boost 
for racially favored groups. We then investigate how attributions of 
causation and intentionality are slanted to favor in-group members. We also 
consider the relative nature of the Implicit Association Test and what it 
means about implicit favoritism. This Part also discusses the fundamentals 
of enhanced in-group empathy and pain sensitivity, details how the human 
memory favors positively stereotyped groups, and presents the leading 
social scientific explanations behind why people act automatically to 
maintain in-group self esteem and the hierarchical status quo.  
 
Part III applies the implicit favoritism social science to improve upon 
the model we developed in Part I. Using the same across-the-system 
structure we employed in the first Part, we present a series of case studies 
that illustrate why implicit favoritism is such a powerful tool for 
understanding disparities in the criminal justice system.  
 
I. A MODEL OF IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS: OUT-GROUP DEROGATION 
 
Implicit racial bias is a tool that has revolutionized the way that we 
perceive racial disparities in the criminal justice system. As we describe in 
this Part, legal scholars have latched onto implicit bias to explore criminal 
law and procedure. Unfortunately, scholars have focused on only one piece 
of the implicit bias social science—implicit racial bias as out-group 
derogation. In Parts II and III, we will address this gap by introducing the 
other half of the implicit racial bias research—implicit bias as favoritism.  
 
This Part begins with an overview of implicit racial bias. Focusing on 
scholarship with direct implications for the criminal justice system, we 
provide a comprehensive review of empirical studies documenting the 
existence of implicit racial bias and non-empirical interpretations of how 
implicit racial bias interacts with various stages of the criminal justice 
system. As we proceed through each of the areas in which scholars have 
pointed out that implicit racial bias can operate to perpetuate disparities, we 
carefully develop how scholars can significantly enhance this already 
groundbreaking scholarship by highlighting implicit favoritism in addition 
to out-group derogation.  
 
A.  An Overview of Implicit Racial Bias 
 
The most efficient way for us to find out your favorite ice cream flavor 
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is simply to ask. Whether its mint chocolate chip or caramel brownie, there 
is little reason to worry that your answer will be inaccurate. The direct 
approach is not the best option for every context, however. Questions about 
racial preferences and animosities do not lend themselves to direct 
questioning for two different reasons. First, even if many people continue to 
hold racist beliefs, Americans have learned that—unlike your favorite ice 
cream flavor—there is a strong societal commitment to racial 
colorblindness.14 Publically acknowledging a racial preference (or 
animosity) is socially unacceptable.  
 
The second reason why direct questioning is not effective when asking 
about racial attitudes is that while many Americans genuinely believe 
themselves to be colorblind and egalitarian, our minds betray our best 
intentions.15 Our minds automatically sort incoming information into 
categories. This cognitive process is known generally as implicit social 
cognition.16 In an attempt to familiarize implicit social cognition for legal 
audiences, Professor Kang explained its operation with an elegantly simple 
example: “[w]hen we see something with a flat seat, a back, and some legs, 
we recognize it as a ‘chair’ . . . we know what to do with an object that fits 
into the category ‘chair.’ Without spending a lot of mental energy, we 
simply sit.”17 The impact of implicit social cognition is not always so 
innocuous. Social psychologists have documented the tendency for people 
to exhibit implicit preferences for groups with higher social status to groups 
with lower social status.18 For example, people tend to prefer young people 
                                                
14 See, e.g., Adam Apfelbaum et al., Racial Color Blindness: Emergence, Practice, and 
Implications, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 205, 205 (2012). 
15 Id. at 205-206. 
16 See especially Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 945; Justin D. Levinson, 
Racial Disparities, Social Science, and the Legal System, in Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. 
Smith (eds.), IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 1 (2012)[hereinafter Levinson, 
Racial Disparities]. 
17 JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
COURTS 1 (2009), available at http://wp.jerrykang.net.s110363.gridserver.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-for-courts-09.pdf. See also ZIVA 
KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 17-18 (1999); Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A 
Continuum of Impression Formation, from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: 
Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4, 23-24 (1990); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., 
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive 
Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. 
Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and 
Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001). 
18 See generally Anthony G. Greenwald, DE McGhee, & JLK Schwartz, Measuring 
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) [hereinafter Greenwald et. al., Measuring 
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to old people, heterosexual people to homosexual people, abled people to 
disabled people, and white people to black people.19  
 
The strand of implicit social cognition that addresses the process by 
which incoming information is sorted into racial categories is labeled 
implicit racial bias.20 A rich and overlapping literature documents the 
tendency of Americans to exhibit implicit racial bias in favor of white 
Americans over black Americans.21 Though Asian and Latino Americans 
all show consistent implicit preference for white Americans over black 
Americans, white Americans register the strongest white over black implicit 
preference.22 
 
These preferences—or implicit biases—are typically measured by one 
of two methods. The first is known as “priming.”23 Priming seeks to assess 
                                                                                                                       
Individual Differences]; Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R Banaji, Implicit Social 
Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (2005); John T. 
Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Brian A. Nosek, A Decade of System Justification Theory: 
Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 26 
POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004). 
19 Preference, in this context, refers both to implicit attitudes (e.g. positive or negative) 
and stereotypes (e.g. intelligent; athletic). See especially Greenwald et al., Measuring 
Individual Differences; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, A Decade of System Justification Theory: 
Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 26 
POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can be Measured, in 
H.L. Roediger, III, J.S. Nairne, I. Neath, & A. Suprenant (eds.), THE NATURE OF 
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117 (2001). 
20 Levinson & Smith, supra note 8 at 1; Levinson, Racial Disparities, supra note 21 at 
1. 
21 See, e.g., Denise Sekaquaptewa et al., Stereotypic Explanatory Bias: Implicit 
Stereotyping as a Predictor of Discrimination, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 
(2003); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation 
Predicts Amydala Activation, 12 J. COG. NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000); Kang, Trojan Horses 
of Race, supra note 8; Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the 
Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359 (2007); 
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8, at 345. 
22 Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUROPEAN REV. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 38 (2007) (noting that roughly one-
third of black Americans also exhibit implicit white preference, though one-third exhibit 
black preference and the remaining one-third exhibit no statistically significant preference).  
23 See especially Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: 
Associations and Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. 
Q. 23, 23 (1983) (presenting the seminal priming study); Patrician G. Devine, Stereotypes 
and Prejudice: Their Autonomic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 5, 7-8 (1989) (showing that the consequence of subconscious activation of 
negative black racial stereotypes is evaluating ambiguous behavior as aggressive); Jennifer 
L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 881, 883, 885-87 (2004) (finding that research-subjects primed with 
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whether and to what degree exposure to a concept or object (e.g. a black 
face) automatically activates stereotypes (e.g. “black people are hostile”) or 
shapes stereotype-congruent responses to race-neutral prompts (e.g. rating 
an ambiguous shove as more aggressive). For example, Professors Laurie 
Rudman and Matthew Lee used music—either rap or pop—to prime study 
participants in an effort to determine whether the sound of rap music would 
activate racial stereotypes and lead participants to render more negative 
judgments about black people.24 As predicted, listening to rap music not 
only activated black stereotypes, but also led participants to judge the 
behavior of black people as more hostile and less intelligent.25  
 
The second method for measuring implicit racial bias is the best-known 
one: the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”).26 The IAT works by asking 
participants to pair two categories, for example the racial categories of 
“white” or “black” with a series of positive (e.g. “motivated”) or negative 
(e.g. “lazy”) attributes, typically attitudes or stereotypes. The point of the 
test is to measure how quickly, in milliseconds, people associate white or 
black people with positive or negative concepts. Pairing speed matters 
because when mental connections between a person and an attribute are 
strong the mind is able to categorize the information more efficiently, which 
leads to shorter response times. Most white people—over 90%—show 
                                                                                                                       
crime-related words or photographs were drawn to black faces earlier and for longer 
periods than white faces); Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 8 at 1509; Laurie A. Rudman 
& Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and 
Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133, 133 (2002).  
24 Rudman & Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and 
Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. at 136–39 (specifying 
that the average participant listened to the music for thirteen minutes).  
25 Id. 
26 Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 23; McConnell & 
Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and 
Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, supra note 22; Jens B. Asendorpf et al., Double 
Dissociation Between Implicit and Explicit Personality Self-Concept: The Case of Shy 
Behavior, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 380, 382 (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald et 
al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: I. An Improved Scoring 
Algorithm, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197 (2003). Readers can take the test 
themselves online at the Project Implicit Website. See Project Implicit, IAT Home, at 
http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo (Last visited July 29, 2013). For other types of 
implicit bias measurement tools, see Irene v. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic 
Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 260-61 (2002). 
Richard Banks and colleagues point out that criticism of the race IAT usually rest on 
normative disagreements about the nature of bias. See R. Richard Banks, Discrimination 
and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1186-87 (2006). 
But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003). 
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implicit white over black attitudinal preferences on the IAT.27  
 
Using these tools, scholars have begun to explore how implicit racial 
bias influences criminal justice.28 In particular, legal scholars have focused 
on implicit negative stereotyping to explain the importance of implicit racial 
bias research for understanding disparities in the criminal justice system.29 
This focus on derogation, rather than favoritism, is easy to understand. 
black Americans—and especially young black males—are implicitly 
associated with dangerousness, criminality and violence, and these 
associations have concerning consequences.30 
 
Consider what can happen when many Americans view a black face. In 
the same way that we see “a flat seat, a back, and some legs” and think 
“chair,” the associations between black Americans and crime, danger and 
violence can become activated when we are exposed to a black face.31 Once 
activated, these implicit associations can color the real-world behavior of 
judges and jurors, prosecutors and police, commutation boards, and defense 
counsel as they make countless decisions across the spectrum of 
discretionary points in the criminal justice system. The remainder of this 
section details how legal scholars have imported and extended the 
experimental evidence of out-group derogation into the criminal justice 
system. We note that although this field has made tremendous progress, 
few, if any, comprehensive attempts have been made to chronicle the power 
of negative stereotyping throughout the criminal justice system. To respond 
to the disparate nature of this still evolving work, we develop multiple 
                                                
27 Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 
supra note 27, at 38; Nilajana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup 
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, supra note 16, at 147 (cataloging studies 
and their results). 
28 See generally, supra notes 10-14. 
29 Id.  
30 See especially, Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 23; 
Rudman & Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of Exposure to Violent and 
Misogynous Rap Music, supra note 29; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, 
Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004) 
[hereinafter, Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black]; Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking 
Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing 
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 383 (2006) [hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Looking 
Deathworthy]; Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
292 (2008). 
31 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black; B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role 
of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. OF PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001).  
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stages of the criminal justice system where implicit out-group derogation 
can seep into the criminal justice process and aggregate across the stages of 
a case. This discussion not only exemplifies the potential of an implicit bias 
model of criminal racial disparities, but it also sets the stage for our 
subsequent expansion of the model. 
 
B.  Step 1: Out-Group Derogation and Legislation 
 
Implicit racial bias can enter into the criminal justice system at the very 
earliest point: when legislators set forth the behaviors that will constitute 
substantive crimes and set the sanctions that follow from commission of 
those crimes. Professor John Hart Ely explained that legislators are less 
likely to enact excessively punitive laws when “people like us” could be 
exposed to the punishment.32 In other words, “political processes” will 
“block beheading as the penalty for tax fraud,” because “the system is 
constructed so that ‘people like us’ run no realistic risk of such 
punishment.”33 The “us” refers to white Americans, who dominate the 
legislative branch at all levels of government. Prominent scholars, including 
Michelle Alexander, suggest that the exploding black prison population is 
evidence of this “us” versus “them” process. She labels contemporary mass 
incarceration as a “stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised systems of 
racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim 
Crow.”34 
 
While it is possible that intentional discrimination drives some 
legislative disparities, the implicit bias lens offers a richer and more 
behaviorally accurate explanation for racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system. It suggests that the “us” versus “them” legislative process 
can result from implicit as well as explicit bias. As extensive research 
documents, black Americans are stereotyped as hostile, aggressive and 
prone to criminality.35 Professor Ogletree and his colleagues examine how 
                                                
32 EQUAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 
(2011) (listing 31 states—every death penalty state save Alabama, Florida and Delaware—
in which juries render the death determination without input from the trial judge). 
33 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 173 
(1980). 
34 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, supra note 2 at 4 (arguing that the 
“war on drugs” and the deliberate attempt of conservative operatives in the 1980s to use 
coded language—including tough on crime slogans—to stoke racism and win the support 
of Southern White Democrats is evidence of whites intentionally using the criminal justice 
system to control black citizens.). 
35 See, e.g. Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic 
Are They? Introduction to the Special Section, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 757 
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this implicit negative stereotyping of black Americans can drive disparate 
legislative determinations regarding punishment.36 In this examination, 
Ogletree and colleagues focus on the massive punishment disparity between 
powder and crack cocaine in the late 1980s.37 Contemporaneous with the 
broader narrative of the decline of urban America and rise in inner-city 
crime, Americans increasingly associated crack cocaine with “crack 
murders” and other violent crime.38 Disparate punishment for crack cocaine 
usage, then, became a necessary tool for controlling crime, and therefore 
controlling black Americans.39  
 
Ogletree and colleagues propose that rather than a purposeful desire to 
disproportionately punish black America, “[o]ur legislators saw a … fear of 
black people ratchet[ing] up the perceived dangerousness of crack cocaine 
use … and the stereotype that blacks are violent and prone to criminality 
further justified the [100:1] huge disparity between sentences for the use of 
crack and powdered cocaine.”40 In other words, Americans saw crack as a 
“black” problem. To prevent the crack epidemic from spilling out of 
America’s urban ghettos and into its tree-lined and comparatively white 
suburbs, its participants—drug dealers and users alike—needed to be 
removed from the nation’s cities and placed into its growing prison 
system.41 Hence, Congress—and state legislatures across the country—
enacted harsh laws to combat crack.  
 
Ogletree and colleagues suggest that the same underlying dynamics 
might have contributed to “the genesis of America’s drug war.”42 Noting 
the strong implicit association between drugs and black Americans, 
Ogletree and colleagues suggest that the “common misperception that 
blacks use drugs more prevalently than whites” means that the “face of drug 
crime is black”; and thus, “when policymakers consider crime policy 
options, the stereotype of the violent black criminal has a substantial impact 
                                                                                                                       
(2001); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (1989); John Jost et al., The 
Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and 
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager 
Should Ignore, 29 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39 (2009). 
36 Ogletree, et. al., Coloring Punishment, supra note 4 at 46. 
37 Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA ST. U. 
L. REV. 841, 855, n.66 (2010) (noting “crack babies”); Id. at note 60 (on crack murders). 
38 Id. at 855, n.66 (noting “crack babies”); Id. at n.60 (on crack murders).  
39 Id. at n.107.  
40 Ogletree, et. al., Coloring Punishment, supra note 4 at 46. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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on [harsh] drug policy.”43 To be clear, the point made by Ogletree and 
colleagues is not the implicit racial bias is the reason why harsh penalties 
for drug crimes exist, but rather that equating drug crime—especially crack-
cocaine usage—with black crime activates a host of negative stereotypes 
about black Americans and those associations, taken together, create a filter 
through which legislative (and enforcement) decisions are made.  
 
C.  Step 2: Out-Group Derogation and Policing 
 
Police officers make countless discretionary decisions, and implicit 
racial bias can be activated at one of many junctures. Consider the decision 
to pull over a vehicle on suspicion of wrongdoing. In states ranging from 
Missouri to North Carolina to Wisconsin, data from hundreds of thousands 
of traffic stops demonstrates that police disproportionately stop vehicles 
when black Americans are driving them.44 This fact is so well known that it 
has its own colloquial name—driving while black.45 Though dubbed driving 
while black, the expression applies with equal ease to black citizens on foot. 
 
Consider the decision to stop-and-frisk a citizen, which is governed by 
Terry v. Ohio.46 The Terry Court specified that even in the absence of 
probable cause police officers can stop an individual whom they believe is 
                                                
43 Id. 
44 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE 
AND THE PUBLIC 2005, at 1 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05/pdf; Ian A. Mance, Racial Profiling in 
North Carolina: Racial Disparities in Traffic Stops 2000 to 2011, TRIAL BRIEF 23-27 
(2012) (describing results from a decade long study of nearly 14 million traffic stops in 
North Carolina and noting that the “numbers show black drivers are more likely to be 
stopped by police than white drivers, they show significant disparities in treatment once 
these motorists are in police control”). 
45 The Urban Dictionary defines “Driving While Black” as “refer[ing] to the idea that a 
motorist can be pulled over by a police officer simply because he or she is black and then 
charged with a trivial or perhaps non-existent offense.” Available at: 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=driving%20while%20black (last visited 
Aug 1, 2013). See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic 
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
544 (1997); David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's 
Highways, ACLU SPECIAL REPORT 83 (June 1999); David A. Harris, The Stories, the 
Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 
(1999); Katheryn K. Russell, “Driving While Black”: Corollary Phenomena and 
Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C.L. REV. 717 (1999); John Lamberth, Driving While 
Black; A Statistician Proves That Prejudice Still Rules the Road, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 
1998, at C1. 
46 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
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engaging in criminal conduct and frisk the individual for weapons.47 The 
Terry Court specified that the Fourth Amendment only required reasonable 
suspicion, which means that officers “must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts,” as opposed to mere “hunches” or other “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicions.”48 These “articulable facts” must “lead [the 
officer] reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot” or that the individual is armed and dangerous.”49 By 
establishing an “articulable suspicion” standard, the Court intended to 
protect against racial hunches.  
 
More than half of the pedestrians who were stopped—and frisked—in 
the past decade by New York City police officers are black.50 This pattern 
holds true both in predominantly black and predominately white 
neighborhoods. One concrete result that flows from disparate stops are 
disparate drug arrests: although black and white citizens use illegal drugs at 
a roughly proportionate rates, blacks are three times more likely than whites 
to be arrested for drug-related offenses.51 The blame for disproportionate 
stops, searches and arrests—when the suspect is in a vehicle or on foot—is 
often placed on police officers. One explanation is that police officers stop 
blacks when they do not “belong” in the location where they were found. 
For instance, Harry Lee, the once infamous sheriff of Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana, used to order his deputies to pull over and question “young 
blacks in rinky-dink” cars who had the audacity of driving through white 
neighborhoods.52 Another explanation of racial disparities in police stops, 
searches and arrests is that neighborhoods with concentrated black 
                                                
47 Id. at 27 (“[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances, 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger”). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 This data is collected by the New York Civil Liberties Union, and is available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last accessed August 4, 2013). 
51 Marijuana arrests comprise roughly half of all drug arrests nationwide. Despite 
roughly equal usage rates and arrest rates, black Americans are arrested for marijuana 
possession 3.73 times more often than whites. See THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 8-9 (2013) citing NATIONAL CENTER ON 
ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S 
PRISON POPULATION 2, 14 (2010) available at 
http://www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/575-report2010behindbars2.pdf) and SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. MARIJUANA USE IN LIFETIME, PAST YEAR, 
AND PAST MONTH AMONG PERSONS AGED 18-25, BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 
available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/nsduh/2k10NSDUH/tabs/Sect1peTabs1to46.htm. 
52 John Burnett, Larger-Than-Life Sheriff Rules Louisiana Parish, NPR, Nov. 28, 
2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=6549329. 
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populations are disproportionately policed.53  
 
Implicit racial bias offers an alternative—and more palatable—
explanation to those offered by Sheriff Lee. Implicit bias research has 
demonstrated that reasonable suspicion is not a race-neutral concept. 
Professor Richardson has explained that though police officers are 
permitted to stop a suspect “when their behavior is objectively 
suspicious”—a determination that must be made “regardless of their 
race”—implicit racial bias can alter the suspicion threshold by activating 
“[n]onconscious stereotype activation in the presence of black 
individuals.”54 Consider a study by Professor Eberhardt and colleagues that 
tested whether the stereotypicality of white and black faces (e.g. broad nose, 
thick lips) influences whether a police officer believes that a citizen “looks 
like a criminal.”55 The study divided the police officer participants into two 
groups.56 The first group saw a series of white faces, while the second group 
saw a series of black faces. A random subset of the officers also performed 
a test that required them to rate each face based on the degree to which the 
face was stereotypically black (or white). Another subset of the officers 
performed a test that required them to ascertain whether each face “looked 
criminal.” As predicted, the more stereotypically black the face, the more 
the officers rated the face as looking criminal.57  
 
Eberhardt and colleagues also tested whether priming policing officers 
with crime-relevant words—e.g. violent, crime, arrest, shoot, capture, 
chase—would cause officers to avert attention towards black faces.58 After 
being primed with a crime-relevant word, officers saw a screen that 
contained two images—one of a black face and the other of a white face. 
The faces disappeared from the screen and a dot-probe was placed on either 
the half of the screen that contained the white face or the half that contained 
the black face. Overwhelmingly, police officers more quickly located the 
dot on the screen when it was located on the half of the screen that had 
displayed the black face.59 Furthermore, police officers were slower to 
locate the dot-probe in the side of the screen that displayed a white face 
when primed with crime-relevant words than when receiving no prime. 
                                                
53 Id. 
54 Richardson, Arrest Efficiency, supra note 3.  
55 Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy, supra note 35. 
56 Id. The pictures used were of students and employees of Stanford University. 
57 Id. 
58 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 35. 
59 Id. 
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Thus, the study produced results suggesting both the concept of crime is 
associated with black faces and disassociated with white faces.60 
 
In a third study, Professor Eberhardt and her colleagues used racial 
primes to test whether people are able to identify crime-relevant objects in 
fewer frames after being primed with a black face than when they received 
either no prime or were primed with a white face.61 After receiving a prime 
(or not), participants viewed a background image of a dilapidated 
neighborhood. In the foreground participants saw one of two degraded 
images come into focus over a series of forty-one frames. The first image 
was crime relevant—a gun or a knife—and the second image was crime 
irrelevant—a camera or a book.62 As predicted, participants correctly 
identified a crime-relevant object in fewer frames when primed with a black 
face than when primed with either a white face or no face.63  
 
The fact that police officers are more likely to find that a citizen “looks 
like a criminal” when he appears as stereotypically black and are more 
likely to recognize an object as crime-relevant when primed with a black 
face strongly suggests, as Professor Richardson has observed, that “officers 
[are more likely] to interpret ambiguous behaviors performed by blacks as 
suspicious and criminal,	 while similar behaviors engaged in by whites 
would go unnoticed.”64 Such an interpretation helps to contextualize the 
effect that cognitive forces may have in the police stop context, whether it 
be the stopping of automobiles or pedestrians. 
 
Once police stop a suspect, however, the likelihood of implicit bias in 
officer decision-making does not diminish. This bias arises because of the 
stereotype-sensitive situation confronted by officers at this stage. In 
particular, an officer must always be on alert for aggressive behavior on the 
part of the citizen. A decision whether a suspect presents an imminent threat 
necessitating the use of force is one that must be made in milliseconds. 
Does the suspect have a gun—or is that shiny object a cell phone? Implicit 
bias research sheds direct light on such questions.  
 
                                                
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 35. The Eberhardt study corroborated and 
improved upon an earlier study by Professor Payne, who found that study participants 
could identify a “tool” more quickly after being primed with a white face, but identify a 
gun more quickly after being primed with a black face. See Payne, Prejudice and 
Perception, supra note 36. 
64 Richardson, Police Efficiency, supra note 9, at 1145.  
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Consider the “shooter bias” study paradigm—a customized video game 
in which a person appears on the screen holding either a cell phone or a 
gun.65 In this study, participants are instructed to “shoot” a person holding a 
gun, or “not shoot” a person holding a non-gun object, as rapidly as 
possible. The results of this study paradigm are consistent. Participants 
make the decision to shoot more often and more rapidly when a black 
person holds a gun compared to when a white person holds a gun.66 
Similarly, an analysis of participant errors shows that participants are more 
likely to accidentally shoot an unarmed man when he is black than when he 
is white.67 Researchers have even employed this “shooter bias” study using 
police officer participants.68 When doing so, results of the study indicated 
that although police officers were able to avoid making significantly more 
race-based shooting errors, they nonetheless pulled the trigger more quickly 
when viewing armed black men compared to armed white men, and hit the 
“safety” more quickly when viewing unarmed white men compared to 
unarmed black men.69 These studies demonstrate the danger that implicit 
negative stereotypes—out-group derogation—can create for police dealing 
with potential suspects. Although one would hope that officers’ judgments 
as to the dangerousness of a potential suspect would not depend on race, 
research suggests that such judgments may well be automatically infected 
by implicit bias. 
 
Implicit racial bias thus provides a powerful explanation for how 
implicit negative stereotyping of black Americans can lead police officers 
to stop, search, and arrest blacks at disproportionate rates. It also provides a 
glimpse into the decision to use force—or not. Racial bias need not be 
explicit to be harmful. Even the most egalitarian-minded police officers 
might be more likely to pull over black Americans driving “rinky-dink cars 
                                                
65 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1314 (2002). See also Charles M. Judd et al., Automatic Stereotypes vs. Automatic 
Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapons Paradigm, 40 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2004); Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 8, at 
1525-28; Payne, Prejudice and Perception, supra note 36, at 287. 
66 Correll et al., supra note 70. 
67 Id. 
68 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in 
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007). 
69 One IAT paradigm, the Weapons-Race IAT, may help to explain the findings of the 
shooter bias studies. This IAT involves participants pairing either European American and 
African American faces with weapons (e.g. an ax, a rifle) or harmless objects (e.g. a 
briefcase, a calculator). Most people who complete a Weapons-Race IAT exhibit stronger 
associations between Lo´pez black people and weapons and white people and harmless 
objects than between white people and weapons and black people and harmless objects. Id. 
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in white neighborhoods.”70 On the other hand, the implicit racial bias lens 
suggests that modern racial discrimination is more than structural 
inequalities stemming from our history of formal racism. Recall that 
without any hints of social class or prior record, police officers rated black 
faces as appearing more criminal than white faces.71  
 
As helpful as the implicit racial bias lens is for explaining disparities in 
policing, legal scholars have mostly missed the opportunity to confront the 
role that implicit white favoritism plays in discretionary policing. For 
instance, as we explain in detail, Eberhardt and colleagues found that 
participants identified crime relevant objects more slowly when primed with 
a white face than when the researchers provided no prime.72 The fact that 
officers disassociate crime—or at least street crime—with white Americans 
means that police could overlook questionable activity when a white person 
is behind the wheel or on foot. In other words, disparities in policing stem 
not only from black Americans being stereotyped as criminal and 
dangerous, but also by white Americans being stereotyped as law-abiding 
and safe. 
 
D.  Step 3: Out-Group Derogation and Juries 
 
Juries, as the Supreme Court wrote in Witherspoon v. Illinois,73 
“maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system,”74 and serve as a “link” to and “speak for” the community.75 The 
most common role that juries play is to decide whether a defendant is guilty 
of the crime charged.76 The Constitution requires that defendants are 
presumed innocent and that the prosecution can only obtain a conviction by 
proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.77 Although 
the presumption of innocence is one of the most important concepts in 
criminal law, research by Professor Levinson and his colleagues suggests 
                                                
70 Burnett, Larger-Than-Life Sheriff Rules Louisiana Parish, supra note 57. 
71 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 35, at 889. The authors also note that “a 
planned contrast analysis revealed that highly stereotypical black faces were more likely to 
be judged criminal than any other group in the study.” Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
74 Id. at n.15. 
75 Id.  
76 On the historic role of juries in the American judicial system, see especially Akhil 
Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996).  
77 In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (explaining that “[t]he requirement that guilt of 
a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our 
early years as a Nation”). 
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that the jury process may be so infected by implicit bias that the 
presumption of innocence becomes, at the least, superfluous.78  
 
Several studies suggest that the protections provided to defendants in 
jury trials may not overcome the dangerous role of implicit bias in criminal 
trials. In one study, Levinson and his colleagues hypothesized that 
Americans, in fact, implicitly associate black people with guilt and white 
people with lack of guilt.79 The researchers administered a version of the 
IAT designed to measure whether participants exhibited stronger 
associations between black and “guilty” and white and “not guilty”, 
compared to black and “not guilty” and white and “guilty.”80 As predicted, 
participants exhibited significantly stronger associations between black 
people and “guilty” than they did white people and “guilty.”81  
 
In another study, Professor Danielle Young and her colleagues showed 
mock-jurors (sitting in a jury box) videotaped jury instructions delivered by 
a federal judge.82 Half of the mock-jurors received jury instructions that 
included the presumption of innocence instructions, while the other half 
received jury instructions without it.83 Immediately following the jury 
instructions, the researchers employed a dot-probe task (much like 
Eberhardt and colleagues used with their police participants) and found that 
the presumption of innocence instructions actually shifted mock jurors’ 
attention towards faces of black men (relative to faces of white men).84 
Because similar priming research, such as those by Eberhardt and 
colleagues, shows that concepts such as crime and ape prime attention for 
black faces, and because IATs have confirmed that people implicitly 
associate black with guilty, the researchers interpreted this result to suggest 
that the presumption of innocence may be counterintuitively and 
                                                
78 See Levinson, Cai, & Young, supra note 8; Danielle Young, Justin Levinson & 
Scott Sinnett, Innocent Until Primed: Mock Jurors Racial Biased Response to the 
Presumption of Innocence, PLOS ONE(forthcoming, 2014) (on file with authors). 
79 Levinson, Cai, & Young, supra note 8. 
80 Id. 
81 One might surmise that judges should be entrusted to decide guilt and innocence in 
criminal trials. Judges, too, exhibit implicit racial bias. Professor Rachlinski and his 
colleagues found that judges from three distinct regions of the United States displayed a 
strong implicit white preference. Moreover, the judges whom exhibited strong white 
preference also assigned greater punishment to racially ambiguous suspects after receiving 
a black race prime and reading a fictional crime narrative. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich, & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009). 
82 See Young, Levinson, & Sinnett, supra note 84. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
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inadvertently triggering racial stereotypes of aggressive black males. 
 
The idea that black defendants might start trials with a diluted (or even 
worse, corrupted) presumption of innocence is worrisome, but it is not the 
only problem illustrated by implicit racial bias research on mock jurors. 
Research suggests that race also colors how jurors assess the probative 
value of ambiguous pieces of evidence.85 Professors Levinson and Young 
tested whether briefly viewing a surveillance photo of a dark-skinned 
perpetrator would lead participants to interpret ambiguous pieces of 
evidence—i.e. those that are not facially probative of either guilt or 
innocence alone—as more or less indicative of guilt than they would when 
seeing a surveillance photo of a lighter-skinned perpetrator.86 The mock-
juror participants began that study by reading a short description of a 
fictional Mini-Mart robbery. They then viewed a series of photographs from 
the fictional crime scene. One of the photographs—the prime—displayed a 
masked assailant pointing a gun across the counter. The assailant’s skin 
color could be determined from the skin tone of his forearm. Half of the 
participants saw a darker skinned suspect while the other half saw a lighter 
skinned suspect.87 
 
After reading the robbery narrative and viewing the crime scene 
photographs, participants were introduced to pieces of evidence discovered 
during the investigation of the crime and asked whether and to what degree 
each piece of evidence is probative of guilt.88 Participants primed with the 
dark-skinned suspect believed ambiguous evidence to be more probative of 
guilt than participants who assessed the same evidence after being primed 
with a light-skinned suspect.89 Participants primed with the dark-skinned 
suspects also evaluated the overall case against the suspect to be more 
probative of guilt—on both a 0 to 100 scale and under a traditional 
guilty/not guilty measure.90  
 
Taken together, a questionable presumption of innocence and a biased 
interpretation of ambiguous evidence are enough to sound serious concern 
about the role of implicit bias in how juries decide if a defendant is guilty. 
Many cases do not present serious questions of factual innocence. Rather, 
                                                
85 See Justin D. Levinson and Danielle Young, Different Shade of Bias: Skin Tone, 
Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 
(2010). 
86 Id. at 310. 
87 Id. at 331-34. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 337. 
90 Id.  
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the majority of crimes—especially violent crimes—are not “whodunits,” 
but richly textured human interactions that turn upon more nuanced how 
and why questions. In these cases, the responsibility of juries is to identify 
gradations of culpability. Did the person who possessed illegal drugs mean 
to engage in distribution? Did the person convicted of 2nd degree murder act 
in the heat of passion? Though punishment exposure increases drastically 
from possession to distribution or from heat of passion to ordinary murder, 
the factual difference between these two crimes often are minor, subjective 
and subject to manipulative recreation. The problem is that very minor 
differences in the underlying facts can make significant differences in the 
ultimate sentence and that our criminal justice system might not lead to an 
acceptable sorting between those who are guilty of aggravated homicide 
and those guilty of second-degree murder. Implicit racial bias matters in 
these determinations, too. 
 
Consider a second-degree murder case where the accused claims that he 
shot the deceased in self-defense. Does it matter if the accused is black and 
the deceased was white? Self-defense claims are necessarily fact-intensive. 
Who threw the first punch? What words were exchanged? Was either party 
trying to leave the altercation? Implicit racial bias research demonstrates 
that jurors remember—and misremember—details about a crime in racially 
biased ways.91 Recall the “dot-probe” experiment performed by Eberhardt 
and her colleagues in which after being primed with crime-related words 
police officers identified a dot-probe on a screen more quickly when it 
shared the same physical space as a black face (as opposed to a white face). 
A second segment of the same study involved the same police officers 
participating in a memory test—could the officer correctly identify the face 
of the target?92 As it turns out, police officers who were primed with crime-
related words were more likely to falsely identify a different black face as 
the target when the incorrect face exhibited more stereotypically black 
facial features than the target face.93  
 
A study by Levinson demonstrated that race also influences how people 
remember and misremember crime-relevant information.94 Levinson 
provided participants with a fictional story about a confrontation between 
two men. Every participant read the same story, except that half of the 
participants read a story about a white perpetrator named William (who was 
identified as Caucasian) while the other half read about a black perpetrator 
                                                
91 Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8. 
92 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 35, at 888-89. 
93 Id.  
94 Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8. 
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named Tyronne (who was identified as African American).95 As predicated, 
participants remembered aggressive details more accurately when Tyronne 
was the defendant.96 Moreover, participants sometimes misremembered 
"facts" not included in the story more often when those facts were 
stereotype-congruent (e.g. incorrectly remembering the black perpetrator as 
the aggressor).97  
 
Taken together, these studies suggest both that “crime” and “black” are 
connected inside the minds of most Americans and that even the slightest 
injection of race creates a risk that people will misremember black faces and 
misremember the facts of a case in stereotype-congruent ways. As Professor 
Cynthia Lee explains, self-defense claims often turn on whether the person 
who exercised self-help had a “reasonable” basis to believe the he was in 
immediate danger of imminent bodily harm.98 Lee asks us contemplate how 
race might influence how the jury decides whether the defendant had a 
reasonable basis to believe that he face imminent danger. Drawing on the 
associations between black and weapons, as well as the shooter bias studies 
that demonstrate that participants are faster to mistakenly shoot unarmed 
blacks Americans more often than white Americans, Lee suggests that 
jurors would be more likely to find that the defendant acted reasonably if 
the deceased was black than if the deceased was white.99 
 
Or consider future dangerousness determinations in the penalty phase of 
capital trials.100 Every death penalty statute has a list of aggravating 
factors.101 Jurors must find at least one aggravating factor before a 
convicted murderer is eligible for a possible death sentence.102 Professors 
                                                
95 Id. at 391-92. 
96 Id. at 398-401. 
97 Id. at 401-02. 
98 Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet 
Post Racial Society, 92 N.C. L. REV. 101, 109 (2013). 
99 Id. at 109. 
100 In order to be eligible for the death penalty, a defendant must be convicted of the 
homicide offense and the jury must find that at least one aggravating factor exists. An 
aggravating factor serves the role of ensuring that only those defendants that commit the 
most heinous offenses receive the death penalty. See Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, 
Capital Punishment: Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly) in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS 
THE LAW 229 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds. 2012)[hereinafter, Capital 
Punishment]. 
101 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365 (1988) (“One of the most common 
examples is known as “HAC” or the heinous, atrocious and cruel” aggravator.”). 
102 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]herever 
[aggravating] factors exist they must be subject to the usual requirements of the common 
law, and to the requirement enshrined in our Constitution, in criminal cases: they must be 
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Smith and Cohen have suggested that one such aggravating factor—the so 
called “future dangerousness” factor, which asks the jury whether the 
defendant is likely to harm others while in prison—is susceptible to being 
influenced by the operation of implicit racial bias.103 Smith and Cohen 
explain that future dangerousness is really a way of asking the jury “how 
scary is this defendant”?104 As the Supreme Court has reminded us, “a juror 
who believes that blacks are violence prone … might well be influenced by 
that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating 
factors specified under [the] law.”105 Furthermore, as Smith and Cohen 
highlight, “[t]his stereotype that black persons are fearsome appears to be so 
powerful as to activate a discriminatory response at the neurological level 
… when participants were shown black faces, brain activity spiked (for both 
white and black participants) in the region of the brain responsible for 
responding to possible threats and other hostile activity.”106 Thus, when 
asked to decide if a capital defendant is a “future danger,” the “presence of 
a stereotypic belief [on behalf of jurors] that a black defendant is more 
violence prone combined with a fear-based response towards the black 
defendant creates an unacceptable risk that the dangerousness evaluation is 
influenced by the race of the defendant.”107 
 
As this discussion has demonstrated, jurors often are charged with 
deciding not only guilt and innocence, but also degrees of culpability, and 
even whether a defendant should live or die. Implicit racial bias research 
suggests that all of these juror-dependent decisions may well be made 
through a lens of implicit negative stereotyping of black Americans.  
 
E.  Step 4: Out-Group Derogation and Legal Professionals 
 
So far, this section has explored how legislators, jurors and police 
officers exhibit implicit racial bias at multiple stages of the criminal justice 
system. What about legal professionals—the prosecutors and defense 
lawyers that prosecute and defend criminal cases?  
                                                                                                                       
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
103 Smith & Cohen, Capital Punishment, supra note 105. For an additional perspective 
on the way negative implicit biases may function in capital cases, see Justin D. Levinson, 
Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (2009) (suggesting a 
“Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis” and a “Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis”). 
104 Smith & Cohen, supra note 105. 
105  Id.  
106 Id., citing Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related 
Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005).  
107 Id. 
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Recent empirical studies of the federal criminal justice system suggest 
that prosecutorial discretion is the major driver of racial disparities.108 
Specifically, disparities seem to originate from initial charging decisions—
with the decision to charge an arrestee with an offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum sentence being the biggest culprit.109 Imagine a prosecutor 
deciding whether to charge a juvenile in the adult system as opposed to the 
juvenile justice system. Prosecutorial guidelines for deciding whether to 
charge a juvenile as an adult stress the importance of several factors, 
including: “The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living”;110 “[t]he seriousness of the alleged offense”;111 
“[w]hether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner”;112 and “[t]he prospects for adequate 
protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the 
juvenile.”113 Are these factors race neutral or instead influenced by negative 
stereotypes of black Americans?  
 
Interested in just this question of race and perceptions of juvenile 
offenders, Professors Graham and Lowery conducted an experiment 
designed to test whether police officers and probation officers would 
indicate a preference for harsher punishment after being primed with 
stereotypically black words (e.g. “Harlem”, “dreadlocks”, “homeboy”).114 
Participants—police and probation officers—read two different fictional 
crime reports. Both reports described a racially ambiguous juvenile suspect. 
The first report described an accusation by a convenience store manager 
that a twelve year-old boy with no prior record took miscellaneous toys 
                                                
108 Sonja Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging 
and its Sentencing Consequences (2012) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/NSPI201213.pdf/$file/NSPI201213.pdf.  
109 Id. at 3. (most “sentence gaps can be explained by prosecutors’ initial charging 
decisions—particularly the choice to bring mandatory minimum charges. The mandatory 
minimum indicator can explain nearly seven percentage points of the race gap at the mean 
and has a significant and sizeable explanatory effect at every decile, ranging from five to 
nine percentage points”). 
110 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966) (listing factors to be considered 
in deciding whether to transfer a case to adult court). 
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes 
About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 483 (2004). This study 
borrowed some of its methodology from research conducted by Patricia Devine. See 
Devine, supra note 28, at 7, 9, 13. 
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valued at $40 from the store. The boy denied stealing the toys. No witnesses 
had emerged.115 In the second crime report, which involved an assault by a 
fifteen year-old boy on a sixteen year-old, conflicting witness accounts 
made it unclear whom started the fight and whether the fifteen year-old 
suspect acted in self-defense.116 The results of the study were striking: 
Those officers unconsciously primed by black-associated words attributed 
the juvenile suspects as more culpable and deserving of punishment, and 
less immature on account of their adolescence.117  
 
In another telling study that linked anti-black implicit bias with the way 
people perceive blameworthiness and punishment, Dr. Rattan and 
colleagues presented participants with a case of a fourteen year-old juvenile 
defendant who had brutally raped an elderly woman.118 Half the participants 
read the narrative with the juvenile described as being black; the other half 
read the same narrative except the juvenile was described as white.119 
Subsequently, participants were asked two questions: “to what extent do 
you support life sentences with no possibility of parole for juveniles when 
they have been convicted of serious violent crimes (in which no one was 
killed)?” and “how much do you believe that juveniles who commit crimes 
such as these should be considered less blameworthy than an adult who 
committed the same crime?”120 As predicted, when primed with the black 
juvenile (compared to the white juvenile) participants expressed both more 
support for life without parole sentences and indicated a stronger belief that 
juveniles and adults are similarly blameworthy.121 
 
Applying this knowledge to the prosecutorial discretion context, 
imagine a sixteen year-old black male who steals candy from a convenience 
store and punches the clerk in the face before he exits. How might he be 
treated differently than a white male who commits the same offense: Did 
the sixteen year-old punch the clerk in a calculated attempt to avoid being 
caught, because he becomes violent so readily, or simply because he 
panicked?122 Smith and Levinson suggest, “[i]f the juvenile is black, the 
                                                
115 Graham & Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. at 490. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 499-500.  
118 Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction between 
Juveniles and Adults, 7 PLOS ONE PLoS 2 (2012).  
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 2. 
121 Id. at 4. 
122 Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 795, 812 (2012). 
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prosecutor assessing the facts of this case might be primed by the picture of 
the juvenile, the notation that he is black, or even the recognition of a 
stereotypically black name that triggers associations between the black 
juvenile and the concepts of aggression and hostility.”123 Moreover, “[t]he 
activation of these negative constructs can translate into a sense that the 
crime (or the offender) is more aggressive or violent than would be the case 
if the prosecutor assessed the facts of the case in a truly race-neutral 
manner.”124 
 
Even if the decisions of prosecutors, police officers and jurors are 
tainted by implicit racial bias, criminal defense lawyers are supposed to 
fight against injustices—including racial injustices—foisted upon their 
clients. What if defense lawyers, too, are susceptible to implicit racial bias? 
Traditional accounts of racial disparities in the criminal justice system do 
not account for the role that defense lawyers play in manufacturing these 
disparities. Professors Eisenberg and Johnson used a pencil and paper 
version of the race IAT to demonstrate that lawyers who represent 
defendants facing the death penalty, as well as lawyers representing death 
row inmates, exhibit the same implicit white over black preference that 
exists in the general population of participants.125 How might this play out 
in practice? Professors Richardson and Goff explored this question in the 
context of public defender offices.126 With crushing caseloads, public 
defenders often are forced to “triage” cases, which means that despite best 
intentions it is nearly impossible for public defenders to provide adequate 
representation to every client. How does a lawyer choose to spend more 
time on one case over another when those cases are very similar in terms of 
facts and charges?  
 
Richardson and Goff believe that race-based implicit dehumanization 
could play a role in how lawyers “triage” cases.127 Goff himself helped to 
pioneer the research on implicit dehumanization. In an emotionally 
powerful series of studies, Goff and colleagues found that implicit racial 
biases can strike at the core of what it means to be fully human.128 In one 
study, participants recognized degraded pictures of apes in fewer frames 
                                                
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death 
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004). 
126 L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013). 
127 Id. at 2638-40. 
128 Goff et al., supra note 35, at 292-94. 
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when primed with a black face than when primed with a white face.129 In 
another study, participants primed with an ape were faster to detect a dot-
probe when positioned where a black face had appeared on a screen than 
when the dot-probe was positioned where a white face had appeared on the 
screen).130 After establishing this bi-directional relationship between 
“black” and “ape”, Goff and colleagues had participants in a third study 
watch a video of a police chase that ended with police officers beating the 
black suspect after he had exited his vehicle. Use of an ape prime (but not a 
feline prime or no prime at all) significantly increased the degree to which 
participants believed that the officers were justified in their harsh treatment 
of the black suspect.131  
 
Relating the black-ape studies to the public defender context, 
Richardson and Goff suggest that “defenders may be more accepting of 
higher sentencing recommendations for black versus white clients and, thus, 
less likely to negotiate aggressively for lower sentences or to conduct 
mitigation investigations.”132 Ultimately, “[b]ecause of their belief that a 
tougher sentence is appropriate or likely to be imposed, [public defenders] 
may be less likely to fight for their client’s release on bail and spend time, 
effort, and scarce resources negotiating a better plea deal.”133 
 
Thus, scholarship on priming and beyond supports the claim that 
implicit bias may well affect not only the behavior and decision-making of 




The takeaway from the studies on implicit racial bias and the criminal 
justice system is that race continues to matter across the entire criminal 
justice spectrum, though in ways equally less visible and more pervasive 
than previously imagined. Implicit racial bias, especially when considered 
as part of a broader model that examines the various ways even one case 
can be affected by bias provides a more nuanced and expansive view of the 
role that race plays in the criminal justice system—a role that has yet to be 
adequately embraced by criminal justice scholars.  
                                                
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id at 302. 
132 Richardson & Goff, supra note 131, at 2626. See also Smith & Cohen, supra note 
11 (suggesting that the black-ape studies suggest that implicit dehumanization could 
influence the relationship between capital defenders and white clients differently than 
capital defenders and their black clients).  
133 Richardson & Goff, supra note 131, at 2641.  
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Our next goal, one we begin to take up in Part II, is to build a more 
accurate model of implicit bias-driven inequality. Although the social 
science literature demonstrates that implicit racial biases can be attributed to 
derogation (e.g. “black people are hostile”), favoritism (e.g. “white people 
are competent”), or both, legal scholars have treated implicit racial bias as if 
were exclusively comprised of implicit negative stereotyping. In the next 
Part, we explain that implicit white favoritism—a sort of boost on account 
of whiteness—is an equally important segment of implicit racial bias and 
that understanding how and where it operates in the criminal justice system 
is vital for understanding racial disparities.  
 
II. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF IMPLICIT FAVORITISM 
 
The previous Part provided an overview of implicit racial bias and 
illustrated how implicit bias can be used as a tool to help explain disparities 
in the criminal justice system. Though existing scholarship on implicit 
racial bias has significantly improved the behavioral realism of racial 
critiques of criminal justice, we nonetheless concluded that the portrait of 
implicit racial bias that has emerged is an incomplete one because it focuses 
almost exclusively on out-group derogation. This Part introduces the 
equally established other half of implicit racial bias: implicit favoritism.134  
 
Implicit favoritism refers to the positive effects of implicit bias on 
members of privileged groups. Understanding the mechanics of implicit 
favoritism is important for anyone who seeks to reduce disparities in the 
criminal justice system. Removing out-group derogation is not the same as 
being race-neutral. If legislators, police officers, jurors and legal professions 
implicitly favor white Americans then we still possess a racialized justice 
system. In other words, even if all of the implicit negative stereotyping 
miraculously ended tomorrow, the existence of implicit favoritism means 
that racial disparities would bpersist. In Part III we explore concrete 
examples of how implicit favoritism perpetuates racial disparities in 
criminal justice. We start here, first, by exploring the science of favoritism. 
 
We begin by exploring how priming positive racial stereotypes or 
privileged racial group membership leads to positive gains for members of 
the privileged group. Next, we investigate how attributions of causation and 
intentionality are slanted to favor in-group members. We then consider the 
relative nature of the Implicit Association Test and what it means about 
                                                
134 Marilynn B. Brewer, In-group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A 
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 307 (1979). 
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implicit favoritism. Finally, we discuss the fundamentals of enhanced in-
group empathy and pain sensitivity, detail how memory errors may favor 
positively stereotyped group, and present the leading social scientific 
explanations behind why people act automatically to maintain in-group self 
esteem and the hierarchical status quo. The purpose of this Part is not only 
to illustrate implicit racial bias as implicit favoritism, but also to 
demonstrate that favoritism itself is an umbrella terms that capture a variety 
of ways in which Americans tend to implicitly advantage whites. 
 
A.  Priming: A Powerful In-Group Boost 
 
The research on priming discussed in Part I demonstrated that when 
stereotypes related to blacks are activated, these stereotypes could have 
severe consequences for their targets. But this implicit derogation effect is 
only half of the story. The other half of the story is that positive stereotypes 
of whites lead to broad and significant benefits, which include an 
enhancement in the way that others view the stereotyped targets and 
elevations in their own enhanced performance.  
 
 
1. An “Us” versus “Them” Implicit Mentality 
 
At the core of research on implicit in-group favoritism is the principle 
that people automatically associate the in-group, or “us”, with positive 
characteristics, and the out-group, or “them”, with negative characteristics. 
In a creative study that was one of the first to use implicit measures in the 
context of in-group favoritism literature, Charles Perdue and his colleagues 
set out to test just how automatically people associate the in-group with 
positive traits.135 In their study, the researchers presented participants with 
nonsense syllables (sounds without real meaning, such as “xeh”, “yof,” or 
“laj”) and repeatedly grouped these meaningless syllables together with 
either in-group or out-group descriptor words, such as “us” and “them,” or 
“we” and “they.”136 The researchers hypothesized that when the 
meaningless syllables were repeatedly associated with either in-group or 
out-group descriptor words, these syllables would not only become 
cognitively associated with in-group or out-group, but would actually 
become to be viewed more positively or negatively by participants. This 
hypothesis was indeed confirmed. Participants rated meaningless syllables 
more positively when they had been grouped with in-group descriptors and 
                                                
135 Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Concept of 
Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475 (1990). 
136 Id.  
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more negatively with out-group descriptors.137 
 
Building on their initial study, the researchers next set out to test 
whether in-group and out-group descriptor words, subliminally primed, 
could actually influence the speed at which positive and negative concepts 
were recognized.138 In that study, participants were subliminally primed by 
flashing in-group and out-group descriptor words (on a computer screen) at 
speeds at which they were unrecognizable but would nonetheless register 
subliminally.139 The words were immediately followed by either positively 
or negatively valenced traits, and the researchers measured the speed at 
which people were able to categorize these traits as being either positive or 
negative.140 The researchers found that simply priming in-group words 
allowed participants to recognize and process positive words faster, whereas 
priming out-group words allowed participants to recognize and process 
negative words faster.141 This finding was one of the initial confirmations 
that even non-consciously activating in-group constructs could facilitate the 
processing of positive concepts. One limitation of that study, particularly 
for the purposes of declaring it to be a perfect indicator of in-group 
favoritism, is that the researchers could not disambiguate whether in-group 
words facilitated positive processing, whether out-group words facilitated 
out-group derogation, or whether it was a combination of the two. Or put 
more simply, their finding, although powerful, was relative such that it was 
unclear how much of it was due to in-group favoritism alone.  
 
Fortunately, another study by the same researchers addressed this 
challenge.142 Consistent with the principles of implicit in-group favoritism, 
the study confirmed that the strongest priming effect was consistent not 
with out-group derogation, but instead with in-group favoritism. In that 
study, the researchers essentially repeated the core elements of the second 
study, but added a control group that was subliminally primed with a 
meaningless letter string, like “xxx.” Adding this control group allowed the 
researchers to determine whether or not the effects they found in the prior 
study were primarily driven by in-group favoritism or out-group derogation, 
or a mix of the two. Interestingly, results of the study showed that 
participants primed with in-group words were significantly faster to respond 
                                                
137 The results also indicated that the in-group positive associations occurred in the in-
group category compared to the control group. See id. at 477. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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to positive traits than both control and out-group members. In addition, they 
found that both the control group and the out-group tended to respond more 
slowly to positive traits. Thus, the researchers concluded that the in-group 
favoritism they found was a separate and strong phenomenon.143 The study 
thus set the stage for additional studies focusing on the automatic 
categorization effects of in-group membership, including the cognitive 
effects of priming constructs associated with the racial category of white.144 
 
2. Priming “White”: Activating Positive Stereotypes and Inhibiting the 
Recognition of Weapons 
 
Building on research that demonstrated how group membership 
facilitates the implicit transmission of in-group favoritism, researchers 
began priming participants directly with implicit racial constructs and 
measuring the effects of these primes. One such study was conducted by 
Bernd Wittenbrink and his colleagues, who subliminally primed white 
American participants with the words “white”, “black”, a control group non 
word prime (“XXXXX”), or a filler word prime (e.g. “lemon”).145 
Immediately following the prime, researchers presented participants with a 
series of word recognition tasks known as “lexical decision tasks”, in which 
participants were asked to recognize words (or recognize them as non-
                                                
143 For similar study methodologies, see John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, 
Automatic Information Processing and Social Perception: The Influence of Trait 
Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on Impression Formation, 43 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1982). See also Brewer, supra note 139. 
144 A follow up study conducted by Pratto and Shih replicated Perdue and colleagues 
paradigm, but also investigated the research question of whether the “us” versus “them” 
implicit mentality might vary based upon the participants’ individual preference relating to 
social dominance orientation (using a “social dominance orientation” measure that is 
similar to an self-report bias scale). The experimenters noted that under normal conditions, 
there was no difference in terms of in-group bias shown based upon social dominance 
differences among participants. However, when the experimenters created a universal 
threat condition, under which the likelihood of an in-group membership being threatened 
was enhanced, the researchers found that both in-group favoritism and out-group 
derogation were heightened among participants with a high social dominance orientation. 
Thus, unlike Perdue and colleagues’ study, in which the researchers found that in-group 
favoritism was the driving force behind their results, Pratto and Shih found that threat 
conditions independent triggered both strong in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. 
See Felicia Pratto & Margeret Shih, Social Dominance Orientation in Group Context in 
Implicit Group Prejudice, 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 515 (2000). For an explanation of 
Social Dominance Orientation, see Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8 at 
__.  
145 Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and Its 
Relationship with Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 
(1997). 
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words) as quickly as possible. These words had been designed to be either 
stereotypical (positive or negative) of whites and blacks.146 The speed of the 
participants’ recognition of the word or non-word was then compared based 
upon the type of prime (white/black/control) and the positive or negative 
valence of the stereotypic words presented. Results of the study showed that 
racially priming participants automatically made stereotype-consistent 
information cognitively available.147 Consistent with an out-group 
derogation model, those who were primed with black recognized negative 
stereotype words more quickly than those primed with white (or with a 
control). And, consistent with implicit in-group favoritism, those who were 
primed with white recognized positive stereotype words faster than those 
primed with black (or with a control).148 Thus, with respect to the implicit 
favoritism element of the study, priming white independently triggered a 
cognitive progress separate from out-group derogation that worked to 
activate positive white racial stereotypes. 
 
Following Wittenbrink and colleagues’ study, Eberhardt and colleagues’ 
examined whether subliminal racial priming of white or black faces led to 
faster or slower identification of weapons.149 This study is often cited for its 
compelling out-group derogation effects [as we described in Section I], 
which indeed raise a host of justice issues. But, as we will explain, the study 
showed more than implicit out-group derogation related to black stereotypes 
of violence. It also demonstrated the favoritism that may occur because 
white citizens are automatically and cognitively disassociated with violence. 
Specifically, Eberhardt and her colleagues found that, when primed with 
white faces, participants were not only slower to identify weapons 
compared to when participants were primed with black faces, but also that 
they were slower to identify weapons compared to participants who were 
not primed at all.150 Although the participants were entirely unaware of 
whether or not they had even been primed, simply seeing a white face for 
mere milliseconds made it significantly harder for them to perceive a 
weapon than when they saw no face at all.151 This study adds to the priming 
literature that has demonstrated the various ways that in-group membership 
automatically leads to powerful and important differences, both in the ways 
that in-group membership performance is enhanced, the ways in which in-
group members activities may be perceived differently by third parties, and 
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the ways in which priming white activates positive racial stereotypes.  
 
B.  Empathy, the IAT, and Other Implicit Measures: More Favoritism 
 
Beyond the various automatic in-group advantages shown by priming 
methodologies, a variety of other methods have been used to demonstrate 
the ways in which implicit in-group favoritism operates, all of which may 
help to explain disparities in the criminal justice system. For example, 
research in the fields of empathy, attribution, and implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes all contribute to the proof of a powerful, independent, automatic 
in-group favoritism.  
 
1. Empathy with In-Group Members 
 
Being a member of a socially dominant or positively stereotyped in-
group does not only have advantages when it comes to performance boost, 
the facilitation of positive associations, and the inhibition of negative 
associations. It also has equally dynamic effects in terms of the way people 
are reacted to by others, including powerful interpersonal connections of 
empathy. In the criminal justice context, it is hard to isolate an instance in 
which empathy with a suspect, defendant, or victim is unimportant.  
  
Research from social, cognitive and neuropsychology has found that 
empathy is experienced more for in-group members than out-group 
members. Empathy is defined by social scientists as “the ability to 
understand and vicariously share the feelings and thoughts of other 
people.”152 These feelings are critical both inside and outside the legal 
system because, as Matteo Forgiarini and colleagues describe, “they enable 
human beings to tune their mental states to their social environment as well 
as to understand others’ intentions, actions, and behaviors.”153 In the 
criminal justice system, police, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and probation 
officers all must seek to understand such intentions, actions, and behaviors. 
Thus, if people’s empathic abilities are fraught with implicit favoritism for 
in-group members, one might expect that disparities could result at various 
stages in the system.154  
                                                
152 Forgiarini et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
153 Forgiarini et al., supra note 15, at 1. As Jennifer and Michael Inzlict describe, “the 
“vicarious activation of similar neural networks then elicits the associated autonomic and 
somatic responses, thereby allowing the observer to share the target’s motivational and 
emotional states. Empathy, thus, comes to us naturally—we ‘catch’ the other’s emotions—
and this vicarious experience helps us to gain an intuitive understanding of them. Gutsell & 
Inzlicht, supra note 15, at 596 (finding an in-group bias in empathy). 
154 After all, researchers explain that “lack of empathy for the pain of other human 
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People’s empathic reaction to others’ pain is one particular component 
of empathy that is recognized by researchers to be based not on conscious 
ability or recognition, but instead is largely automatic in nature.155 
Unfortunately, research has repeatedly demonstrated that these automatic 
reactions do not function equally to all others’ pain. In fact, the more similar 
the “witness” and the person experiencing the pain, the more one can expect 
an automatic empathic reaction to occur.156 Several studies have confirmed 
this finding, and related principles, by examining the neurological processes 
associated with empathy.157 In a study of affective empathy by Xu and 
colleagues, the researchers used fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging) to measure the elements of what scientists call the “pain matrix,” 
regions in the brain that are activated when a person sees another in pain.158 
They tested whether Chinese and Caucasian participants exhibited different 
brain region reactions when watching in-group and out-group members in 
pain (receiving a needle injection into the cheek compared to rubbing a Q-
tip on the same check).159 The results of the fMRI scans showed that, 
relative to the Q-tip touch, needle penetrations led to the activation pain 
matrix brain regions (the Anterior Cingular Cortext, in particular) for in-
group members but not out-group members.160 Phrased another way, in-
group members’ pain triggered empathic brain responses in fellow in-group 
members but not in out-group members. 
 
A 2011 study not only replicated the finding that people physiologically 
react more to in-group members’ pain than out-group members’ pain, but 
                                                                                                                       
beings may lead to violence, abuse, and deterioration of interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships.” Forgiarini et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
155 Forgiarini et al., supra note 15, at 1.  
156 Id. (citing D. Krebs, Empathy and Altruism, 32 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1134 
(1975); S. D. Preston & F. B. M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 
BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 1 (2001); C. Lamm et al., How Do We Empathize with Someone Who is 
Not Like Us? A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 22 J. COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCI. 362 (2010). 
157 Molenberghs, supra note 15, at 1533. There are two types of empathy – affective 
and cognitive. Affective empathy describes people’s “ability to resonate with what a person 
is feeling” while cognitive empathy refers to “the ability to take the perspective of someone 
else and understand what the person is thinking.” The study by Xu and colleagues, as we 
describe, measures affective empathy. Other studies have examined in-group biases in 
cognitive empathy. See, e.g. Mathur et al., supra note 15 at 1468; Cheon et al., supra note 
15 at 642.  
158 These regions are the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulated cortex. 
Molenberghs, supra note 15, at 1530. Xu et al., supra note 15, at 8525. 
159 Xu et al, supra note 15. 
160 Id. at 8527. 
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also connected this finding to implicit racial bias.161 In that study, Matteo 
Forgiarini and colleagues tested the empathy-related skin conductance 
responses of white (Italian) participants who viewed video clips of white, 
Asian, or African people in pain. In each video clip, participants saw a 
person with a neutral facial expression.162 The camera then shifted 
perspective and zoomed in on the person’s hand, which was either touched 
by an eraser or a needle.163 The researchers found, first, that the participants 
exhibited greater skin conductance responses when watching white people 
in pain than for African people in pain.164 The researchers then tested 
whether race-based empathic differences could be predicted by implicit 
racial attitudes towards whites and blacks. To that end, they administered a 
black-white attitude IAT to participants, and tested the relationship between 
the IAT scores and the participants’ empathic reactions to white and African 
people in pain.165 Interestingly, the results of the study demonstrated that 
implicit racial bias predicted the race differences in empathic response.166 
The more implicit bias the participants showed, the more likely they were to 
display race-based empathic response biases in favor of white people.167 
The results of the study confirm not only that race-based differences in 
empathy for pain exist, but also that such seemingly automatic neurological 
responses are socially dependent and connected with implicit racial bias. 
 
2. Implicit Memory- Forgetting White Aggressiveness 
 
Social psychology often relies heavily on the role of memory in 
cognitive and decision-making processes. As such, memory errors have 
been studied frequently since the 1980’s as a source of understanding how 
bias manifests.168 In the legal context, the role of memory-- for judges, 
jurors, and eyewitnesses-- has been identified as a key factor in potentially 
understanding the role of racial biases in decision-making. Levinson’s 2007 
empirical study on implicit memory bias, in particular, is cited for the 
proposition that black defendants are implicitly penalized because jurors are 
more likely to remember their aggressive actions. In his study, Levinson 
presented mock jurors with facts from a fight that began as a confrontation 
at a bar, distracted participants for approximately 15 minutes, and then 
                                                
161 Forgiarini et al., supra note 15, at 1.  
162 Id.  
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 Id.  
166 Id.  
167 Id. 
168 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 8 at _.  
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tested their recall of the case facts.169 He found that participants who read 
about a black defendant (Tyronne) accurately recalled more of the 
aggressive facts from the case (just over 80%), whereas participants who 
read about a white defendant (William) recalled fewer such facts (under 
70%).170 Although there was no control group in Levinson’s study (the 
study also tested memory biases related to a Native Hawaiian perpetrator, as 
we will discuss, but this was not a control group), the methodology suggests 
that implicit favoritism may have acted to inhibit recall of stereotype-
inconsistent information related to a white perpetrator. Such a result would 
be consistent with Eberhardt’s study, in which the activation of white 
stereotypes inhibited the identification of weapons.171  
 
Another finding in Levinson’s study of memory errors similarly 
supports the connection between the activation of positive stereotypes (such 
as non-violence) and memory errors in the criminal justice system. In 
addition to measuring accuracy of recall, the study also measured whether 
participants displayed false memories of favorable mitigating evidence. 
That is, it tested whether participants incorrectly remembered that the 
defendant, for example, had been provoked. Interestingly, the results on this 
measure showed that participants exhibited such false memories of 
mitigating facts when they read about a Native Hawaiian defendant (more 
frequently than a black or white defendant). Levinson explained this finding 
as potentially connecting local stereotypes regarding the provocation of 
Hawaii’s native peoples and its translation to the courtroom: “the false 
memory result could be explained if the provocation of Hawaiians was a 
societal stereotype.”172 This interpretation is consistent with social cognition 
research that indicates that people are more likely to falsely remember 
expectancy-consistent information.173 
 
Although the data on the role of positive stereotypes on courtroom 
memory errors needs to be further studied in order to separate in-group 
favoritism from out-group derogation biases, the findings suggest that the 
activation of positive stereotypes (whites as non-aggressive and Hawaiians 
                                                
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 We acknowledge that it is nonetheless possible that negative stereotypes of 
aggressive black males drove this finding. Additional research would be required to test it.  
172 Id. at 402. 
173 C. Neil Macrae et al., Creating Memory Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processing 
and the Generation of False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63 (2002). This finding has been 
shown to even be heightened in conditions that detract from the amount of focus employed 
by the participant, which could be similar to a trial in which massive amounts of 
information are conveyed, for example. 
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as being justified in aggressive response) may lead to memory errors and 
false memories that benefit members of these positively stereotypes groups. 
 
3. Altered Attributions; or Favoritism in Explaining Why 
 
Like the research on empathy and implicit memory processes, research 
on the way we understand others’ behavior has been linked to in-group 
favoritism. In this context, the research dates back to 1979, when Thomas 
Pettigrew first described the “Ultimate Attribution Error.”174 The Ultimate 
Attribution Error describes the “systematic patterning of intergroup 
misattributions shaped in part by prejudice.”175 Attributions, of course, are 
central to criminal law processes, ranging from judgments of causation to 
evaluations of internal mental state (such as intentionality).176 Thus, 
automatic in-group favoritism in attributions would be particularly 
concerning in the criminal justice process. 
 
Since Pettrigrew’s initial hypothesis was presented, many studies have 
tested whether perceivers indeed ascribe internal attributions (morality, 
intentionality) to the successes, and external attributions (extenuating and 
temporary circumstances), to the shortcomings of in-group members.177 
One large-scale study by Miles Hewstone aggregated a range of studies on 
intergroup attributions (study participants included American children, 
American college students, Malaysian citizens, students in Singapore, Arab 
and Israeli participants, and more) and considered the results together.178 
His examination found that, indeed, there was a pattern whereby which 
people tended to attribute the positive behaviors of in-group members as 
dispositional and negative behaviors as situational.179 Similarly, people 
attributed the positive behaviors of out-group members as situational. 
However, there were not clear findings that negative behaviors of out-group 
members were typically categorized as dispositional.180 With regard to the 
                                                
174 Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s 
Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1979). 
175 Hewstone, supra note 17, at 311. Hewstone, after reviewing the literature on 
intergroup causal attributions, suggests the “Ultimate Attribution Error” is not the best 
name for the phenomenon, instead suggesting “intergroup attributional bias.” Id. at 332. 
176 See Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore 
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, supra note 17, at 1. 
(“[P]olicymakers develop law related to the human mind without an understanding of the 
human mind itself.”). 
177 See Hewstone, supra note 17 for a description of many of these studies. 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 316. 
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question (important for purposes of this Article) of whether the attributional 
differences are based upon more in-group favoritism or out-group 
derogation, the research tends to suggest that in-group favoritism can be a 
stronger motivator than out-group derogation, although there is ample 
evidence of both.181 Furthermore, Hewstone found that within the category 
of in-group favoritism, there was stronger evidence of in-group protection 
(regarding making situational attributions for negative actions) than there 
was evidence of in-group enhancement (regarding making dispositional 
attributions for positive actions).182 Thus, the evidence suggests that one of 
the strongest potential functions of the “ultimate attribution error” is to 
protect the in-group in situations of potential negativity (by shifting 
attributions from internal to external). It is this type of self and in-group 
status quo protection that may similarly drive other implicit favoritism 
phenomena, a possibility that we discuss infra.183  
 
4. Finding Favoritism in the Implicit Association Test 
 
Much of the legal scholarship on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
has tended to focus on the powerful and automatic cognitive links people 
hold that associate subordinated groups to the negative attitudes and 
stereotypes about them. Indeed, such findings are powerful in the criminal 
justice context and beyond, but they should also be considered within the 
relative context of the test itself. As we have described supra Section II, the 
standard form of the IAT measures how people categorize group members 
with positive and negative attitudes or stereotypes. For example, in the 
classic race-based IAT, participants are asked to group together photos of 
white and black people with words representing either good or bad. A 
strong implicit association harbored by a test-taker in this case means that it 
is easier for that test-taker to group together not just black and bad and 
white and good, but actually that it is easier for that test-taker to group 
together both black and bad and white and good (combined) compared to 
black and good and white and bad (also combined). As a result, using the 
standard IAT methodology alone, it can be difficult to determine whether 
the results are driven only by a strong association between black and bad, a 
strong association between white and Ggood, or both. For purposes of 
understanding how existing scholarship on racial inequality can be 
                                                
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 322. 
183 Although original work on the “ultimate attribution error” tends not to focus 
specifically on the question of whether the attributional errors are automatic in nature, more 
recent research focused on debiasing these errors indicates that such errors indeed are 
driven by automatic stereotyping processes. See, e.g. Stewart et al., supra note 19, at 221. 
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complemented with a broader understanding of implicit favoritism, it is 
important to understand the relative nature of the IAT and what it means. 
 
Consider the interpretational challenge posed by the “Ideal Litigator 
IAT” developed by Kang and colleagues.184 In that study, the researchers 
found that people implicitly associated litigators with white and Scientists 
with Asian. Note that from the results of the study, one cannot accurately 
determine which association is stronger. As Nosek and Banaji observed 
more generally, “[t]he structure of the IAT constrains evaluations to be 
relative comparisons between two opposing categories.”185 In fact, it could 
be possible that there is no particular association between Litigator and 
white compared to Litigator and Asian, but instead that people have 
particularly strong associations of Asian and Scientist compared to white 
and Scientist. Similarly, the Guilty/ Not-Guilty IAT designed by Levinson 
and colleagues found that people implicitly associate black with Guilty and 
white with Not Guilty, compared to black with Not Guilty and white with 
Guilty. These results are powerful either way, but one cannot determine 
from the test as constructed whether or not the implicit bias is actually 
driven by an association of black guilt or white innocence (or at least lack 
of guilt) or some combination of the two. 
 
Fortunately, researchers have developed single category implicit 
measures that have allowed social scientists to conclude that some of the 
most common implicit biases are not only driven by out-group derogation, 
but also independently by in-group favoritism. Brian Nosek and his 
colleagues, for example, created the Go-No Go Association task, a reaction 
time based measure that requires participants to hit the space bar any time 
they see matched categories.186 Thus, unlike a race-attitude IAT, a 
participant taking a race-attitude GNAT would have one racial category 
active (e.g. white) and would be asked to hit the space bar every time a 
positive (vs. negative) word appeared on a computer screen. It is in this 
context that researchers have found that, when tested using the GNAT, not 
only do the most popular IATs represent implicit out-group derogation (e.g. 
an association between black and bad), but also a separate implicit in-group 
favoritism (e.g. an association between white and good).187 Although not all 
IAT results have been tested using the single category GNAT format, these 
                                                
184 Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDIES 886 (2010). 
185 Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Go/No-Go Association Task, 19 SOC. 
COGNITION 625, 657 (2001). 
186 Id. at __.  
187 Id. at 659. 
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results indicate at least that the most commonly tested implicit racial 
attitudes indeed are marked by an implicit in-group bias for whites that is an 
entirely separate phenomenon than the implicit out-group derogation shown 
for blacks. 
 
5. Social Identity Theory to System Justification Theory: Self-Esteem and 
Status Quo Preservation  
 
Thus far, this section has detailed a vast range of research that document 
the powerful and independent nature of implicit in-group favoritism. It is 
clear that there is a unique power and system of automatic benefits that only 
an in-group can generate. This research holds great meaning in the legal 
context. But this meaning cannot be fully applied without first considering 
the question of why. That is, now that it has been established that implicit 
in-group favoritism is automatic, broad, and powerful, how can it be best 
understood? Interestingly, from a historical perspective, the concepts 
underlying people’s automatic desires to favor their own in-groups have 
been present in modern psychology since Tajfel and Turner first described 
Social Identity Theory in 1979.188 Social Identity Theory posits that an 
individual’s self concept is created and defined partially through group 
membership.189 These group memberships, including race, help people 
maintain a positive identity of the self, particularly through enhancing their 
own groups.190  
 
Although modern scholars do not agree on how direct a connection 
should be drawn between Social Identity Theory and modern automatic in-
group favoritism research, the idea that a person’s identity can be enhanced 
by providing benefits to in-group members connects nicely to findings of 
modern research. Tajfel’s and Turner’s focus on identity led researchers to 
examine the relationship between the self (and concepts such as self-
esteem) and one’s in-groups. Smith and Henry, for example, found that 
people actually include their in-groups as part of the self, a finding that 
allows us to understand how in-group enhancement also doubles as self 
enhancement.191 And multiple projects have since supported the claim that 
                                                
188 H. Tajfel & J. C. Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (W. G. Austin & S. Worchel, eds. 
1979). 
189 Sabine Otten & Gordon P. Moskowitz, Evidence for Implicit Evaluative In-Group 
Bias: Affect-Biased Spontaneous Trait Inference in a Minimal Group Paradigm, 36 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 77 (2000).  
190 Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575 (2002). 
191 Id. (citing E.R. Smith & S. Henry, An In-group Becomes Part of the Self: Response 
Evidence, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 635 (1996)). 
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successful intergroup bias in fact does lead to enhanced self esteem.192  
  
As methods in social and cognitive psychology have become more 
focused on automatic cognitions, new and complementary theories have 
been generated that seek to explain how people’s in-group membership is 
central to the maintenance of a positive self concept. One modern social 
psychological theory known as System Justification Theory may help to 
explain how people propagate implicit favoritism, much as they propagate 
implicit out-group derogation, in a way that tends to perpetuate the status 
quo.193 System Justification Theory (SJT) posits that, despite people’s (self 
reported) explicit preferences, they sometimes think and act automatically 
and unconsciously to maintain a structure of social order.194 Specifically, 
SJT posits that people act to boost their own high-status groups and 
subordinate low-status groups because, among other things, maintaining 
social and racial hierarchies strengthens high-status group members’ self 
esteem and helps them create a “rationalization of the status quo.”195  
                                                
192 Id. at 580. 
193 Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications 
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119 (2006). Avital 
Mentovich & John T. Jost, The Ideological “ID”? System Justification and the 
Unconscious Perpetuation of Inequality, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (2008); John T. Jost et al., 
A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and 
Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 6 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 912 (2004) [hereinafter 
Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory]; John T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious 
Forms of System Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status 
Groups, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586, 593 (2002); John T. Jost et al.. Social 
Inequality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence 
of Enhanced System Justification Among the Disadvantaged, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 
(2003); Aaron C. Kay & John T. Jost, Complementary Justice: Effects of "Poor but Happy" 
and "Poor But Honest" Stereotype Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit 
Activation of the Justice Motive, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 823 (2003); Laurie 
A. Rudman et al., Minority Members’ Implicit Attitudes: Automatic Ingroup Bias as a 
Function of Group Status, 20 SOC. COGNITION 294, 294 (2002). 
194 Portions of this paragraph and the next, including footnotes are a verbatim 
description of System Justification Theory presented in Levinson, Forgotten Racial 
Equality, supra note 8, at 362-63. See Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, 
supra note 193, at 912. System Justification Theory evidence shows, for example, that 
many members of minority groups harbor negative stereotypes about their own groups. Id. 
at 884. For a discussion of System Justification Theory in law and social justice, see Blasi 
& Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, 
and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. at 1144-62.  
195 Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory, supra note 193, at 888. In 
addition, SJT offers evidence that explains why even members of low-status groups may 
unconsciously act against their own self interest by choosing to accept (implicitly, at least) 
some aspects of the discrimination and failing to oppose regimes that would improve the 
status quo. Specifically, as Jon Jost and his colleagues explain, “research repeatedly shows 
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Studies by SJT researchers have begun to shed additional light on a 
psychological reason underlying why high status groups tend to take steps 
to enhance their own standing and harm the standing of out-group members. 
Jon Jost and E.P. Thompson tested the relationship between opposition to 
equality and self related measures, including self esteem and neuroticism.196 
The researchers hypothesized that the more members of high status social 
groups (i.e. European Americans) opposed equality (thus reinforcing their 
own dominance), the higher their self esteem (and the lesser their 
neuroticism) would be.197 Their study of several hundred participants 
confirmed this hypothesis.198 The more that European American 
participants opposed equality, the greater their self-esteem was.199 
Similarly, the more the European American participants opposed equality, 
the less their neuroticism was.200 This result shows that Tajfel’s and 
Turner’s findings ring true today and function through automatic cognitive 
processes. People may continue to enhance their own group membership (as 
well as act to harm equality efforts of lower status groups) as psychological 
self enhancement (seeking higher self esteem and lower neuroticism). It 
would make sense, then, when considering both in-group favoritism and 
out-group derogation in the criminal justice system, to approach the issue 
from a perspective that acknowledges the powerful status quo maintenance 
and self esteem enhancement needs that continue to perpetuate a range of 
biased decision-making. 
 
This Part has explained the social science underlying our contention that 
                                                                                                                       
that low-income groups are scarcely more likely than high-income groups to support 
[policies that would help] them.” Id. at 884. 
196 Jon T. Jost & Eric P. Thompson, Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to 
Equality as Independent Predictors of Self-Esteem, Ethnocentrism, and Social Policy 
Attitudes among African Americans and European Americans, 36 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
209 (2000). The researchers measured opposition to equality using half of the Social 
Dominance Orientation Scale developed by Felicia Pratto and her colleagues. Felicia Pratto 
et al., Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and 
Political Attitudes, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741, 742 (1994). For example, 
participants were asked to rate their agreement with the following statements: “Increased 
social equality would be a good thing,” and “ [w]e would have fewer problems if we 
treated different groups more equally.” Jost & Thompson, supra note 215, at 216. For more 
on Social Dominance Orientation, see JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL 
DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) 
(for a discussion on social dominance theory); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra 
note 8, at 361-62. 
197 Jost & Thompson, supra note 196, at 213. 
198 Id. at 217-18. 
199 Id. at 229.  
200 Id. 
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the implicit bias model of racial inequality in criminal justice must be 
broadened to include white favoritism. The following Part provides detailed 
examples of ways in which in-group favoritism may lead to unique benefits 
for white people in the criminal justice system.  
 
III. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AS IN-GROUP FAVORITISM 
 
Legal scholars have analyzed how implicit out-group derogation of 
black Americans helps to explain racial disparities in the American criminal 
justice system. This research has enriched and expanded the boundaries of 
traditional explanations for the persistence of racial disparities. Yet, as we 
have explained, if we want to provide a complete and behaviorally accurate 
account of the mechanics of race discrimination, it is critical to consider not 
only implicit bias as out-group derogation, but also the complimentary 
model of implicit bias as in-group—white—favoritism. The failure of legal 
scholars to account for the positive treatment of whites, in addition to the 
negative treatment of blacks, has rendered whites as a control variable of 
sorts. That is, how white citizens are treated in the criminal justice system 
has been assumed to be race-neutral. The implicit favoritism research 
outlined in Part II demonstrated that this assumption is inaccurate. Instead, 
in-group favoritism can independently and automatically alter decision-
making and behavior, much as out-group derogation can. 
 
This Part suggests that implicit favoritism has an impact at multiple 
junctures in the criminal justice system. As we will describe, it can 
influence the way that legislatures define crimes and set limits on 
punishment. It also can influence the way that jurors, judges, prosecutors 
and defense lawyers exercise their discretion. Coming to terms with implicit 
favoritism is important. First, scholars who study racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system should strive for explanations that are as 
behaviorally accurate as possible. Second, from a more pragmatic 
standpoint, commentators who offer remedial suggestions aimed at 
targeting—or accounting for—implicit negative stereotyping might find that 
lingering favoritism precludes—or dilutes—the intended harm reduction. 
 
Virtually all of the out-group derogation narratives that legal scholars 
tell to explain racial disparities in the carceral system can be made richer by 
including a description of how implicit favoritism operates—not instead of 
implicit negative stereotyping—but in tandem with it. To that end, in this 
part we focus in on the same four actors in the criminal justice system that 
we highlighted in Part I (legislators, police officers, jurors, and legal 
professionals) and retell the narratives through the lens of white favoritism. 
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The goal of this Part is to illustrate both that implicit favoritism creates a 
richer and more behaviorally accurate account of modern race 
discrimination than the out-group derogation model is able to offer on its 
own, and to demonstrate that implicit favoritism is able to help explain 
existing disparities that are left unexplained by implicit negative 
stereotyping models. 
 
A.  Implicit Favoritism and Legislative Judgments 
 
America panicked in the 1980s as a crack-cocaine “epidemic” spread 
throughout its urban core; the media clung to images of “crack murders” 
and fears that “crack babies” might eventually be part of a “biological 
underclass suffering from, among other things, permanent mental 
retardation, deviance, and an inability to perform basic self-care tasks.”201 
Congress reacted with a wildly punitive law that treated crack cocaine as if 
it were one hundred times worse than cocaine in its powdered form.202 The 
100:1—now 18:1— sentencing disparity between crack-cocaine and 
powder-cocaine has become the rallying cry of those that believe that the 
war on drugs is a “war on blacks.” As we explained in Section I, Professor 
Ogletree and his colleagues suggested a more nuanced understanding—that 
implicit negative stereotyping of black Americans as dangerous and prone 
to criminality likely fueled concern over crack-murders and helped 
legislators to see the “proper” response to the crack epidemic as one 
involving increasingly punitive sanctions.203  
 
Between 2005 and 2006, media outlets ran over one hundred stories 
about a new drug “epidemic.”204 Rather than crack, this “epidemic” 
centered on methamphetamine. Legislatures across the country soon 
enacted new laws to address methamphetamine use. Based on the legislative 
response to crack use, one might have expected a draconian legislative 
response. Yet, unlike with crack use, state legislatures responded to the 
perceived methamphetamine epidemic with mostly non-punitive measures 
such as prevention (e.g. restricting sales of the main ingredient), education 
and treatment.205 Two states—Illinois and Montana—even created separate 
rehabilitation focused prisons for methamphetamine users and other states 
created separate rehabilitative focused units in general population 
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prisons.206  
 
Thus, unlike crack, legislatures did not respond to methamphetamine 
usage with draconian prison sentences. Instead, the general response from 
public officials was that “meth” use presented a public health problem that 
warranted a “sympathetic” response—one driven more by “pity” than 
fear.207 The reasons for differences between the responses to crack and 
methamphetamine are difficult to pin down. Unlike crack208, 
methamphetamine is categorized as a “white drug,”209 which suggests the 
possibility that the difference in racial association between crack and meth 
played a role in how people perceived the proper response to the respective 
drugs. Media reports on the meth epidemic focused on rural, poor white 
people as meth users.210 Public officials—most of whom are also white—
did not “think crack and then see black,” as Professor Ogletree and 
colleagues put it, but rather, as Professor Ahrens wrote, “perhaps the fact 
that the majority of methamphetamine users are white [] changed the 
incentives for press, police, and politicians.”211  
 
Implicit favoritism plausibly influenced legislative decisions to treat 
methamphetamine use more leniently than crack use. Though separated by 
class divisions, white methamphetamine users may have received the 
benefit of being perceived implicitly as in-group members—whites are “us” 
and blacks are “them.” As Perdue and colleagues’ studies demonstrated, the 
simple activation of these in-group categorizations can have important 
consequences.212 Indeed, the powerful cognitive associations between the 
in-group and positive traits, and the out-group and negative traits, can help 
to explain how two new drugs took divergent paths of legislative discourse 
and lawmaking. In addition, categorizing the majority of “meth” users as 
“us” not only facilitates connections to positive versus negative traits, but, 
combined with the attributions errors we have already discussed, makes it 
easier to see their drug use as situational—a consequence of rural poverty, 
not a driver of it—as opposed to dispositional.213  
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Another likely pathway for implicit favoritism in the “meth” discourse 
involves in-group empathy response. Drug users—and especially drug 
addicts—suffer. Meth use leads to horrific—and visible—destruction of the 
body (especially to one’s oral health). Meth addiction can aid in the loss of 
one’s ability to hold a stable job and to the destruction of families. But the 
way this destruction is perceived by American decision-makers may be 
framed by implicit favoritism in empathy. Recall Xu and colleagues’ 
research on “pain matrix” brain region activation that found that, when 
witnessing an in-group member receive a painful injection, cognitive 
activity occurred for in-group, but not out-group members.214 Just as with 
the needle entering the cheek of an in-group member, legislators across 
America might have seen these addicts suffering and felt more empathy as 
they imagined the power of methamphetamine addiction to bring its users to 
their knees.  
 
B.  Implicit Favoritism and Police Officers 
 
When legal scholars discuss racial disparities in policing, they tend to 
focus on disproportionately harsh treatment—black Americans are more 
likely to be stopped, searched and arrested than white Americans.215 As 
helpful as the implicit racial bias lens is for explaining these disparities in 
policing, legal scholars have missed the opportunity to confront the role that 
implicit favoritism plays in discretionary policing.  
 
One of the best exemplars of how implicit favoritism can augment and 
amplify implicit bias accounts of police office behavior is in the context of 
traffic stops. We discussed earlier the colloquial phrase driving while black, 
which refers to the perceived tendency of police to make traffic stops based 
on skin color.216 It is easy to conceptualize of the difference between 
driving and driving while black, but there also a difference between driving 
and driving while white. Recall Eberhardt and colleagues’ study in which, 
after being primed with a crime-relevant word, police officers saw a screen 
that contained two images—one of a black face and the other of a white 
face.217 The faces disappeared from the screen and a dot-probe was placed 
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on either the half of the screen that contained the white face or the half that 
contained the black face. Police officers were slower to locate the dot-probe 
on the side of the screen that displayed a white face when primed with 
crime-relevant words than when receiving no prime. Thus, the study 
produced results suggesting that the concept of crime (at least street crime) 
is disassociated with white faces.218 Related studies we described support 
this contention: priming white also inhibited weapon identification,219 and 
Go/ No Go Associations Task studies show consistent associations between 
white and positive attitudes.220 To put these studies generally, seeing white 
automatically means seeing positive, law abiding behavior. 
 
How might the results of these automatic associations between white 
and law abiding matter in the real world? Imagine a car with a broken 
taillight or an expired license plate cruising down the road. As the car 
passes a police officer, the officer can either stop the car and ticket its driver 
or the officer can let the car go. Police officers charged with drug 
interdiction might use these “pre-textual” circumstances to pull over the 
vehicle. Since police officers take longer to link white faces with 
criminality a police officer might be more likely to let the broken taillight or 
expired plate “slide” if the driver is white than if the officer had not noticed 
the race of the driver as the car sped past. Note that this linkage between 
race and letting the violation “slide” may be outside the officer’s conscious 
awareness.  
 
One might question what harm flows from granting leniency. The 
problem is that it is impossible to think about disparities without thinking 
about both harshness and leniency, as both factors constitute unequal 
treatment on the basis of race. Even if we somehow eliminated all implicit 
negative stereotyping of black Americans,221 implicit favoritism could still 
lead to significant disparities in traffic stops. Even with no negative 
stereotypes to perpetuate out-group derogation, it would still take more 
suspicion to override the favoritism and trigger the attention of police 
officers when the suspect is white.  
 
For a more emotionally powerful consideration of why implicit 
                                                
218 Id. 
219 Id.  
220 See Nosek & Banaji, The Go/ No-Go Association Task, supra note 205.  
221 Unfortunately, we are not optimistic about this possibility. We simply mean to 
illustrate that white favoritism is an indispensible part of implicit racial bias that must be 
accounted for by anyone considering the causes of racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system. 
48 BIAS IN THE SHADOWS  (DRAFT) [25-Jan-14 
favoritism matters, recall the shooter-bias studies.222 The studies featured a 
video game in which a person appeared on the screen holding either a cell 
phone or a gun. Participants have to decide whether to shoot (or not shoot) 
as rapidly as possible. As we explained, people decide to shoot less often 
and less rapidly when a white person holds the gun. Scholars treat the fact 
that study participants tend to shoot black Americans more quickly as 
evidence that Americans might not be solicitous enough of black lives, and 
this finding is certainly supported by the misfire statistics in which study 
participants disproportionately shoot unarmed black men. But here, we 
focus on the quicker reaction to blacks with guns than whites with guns. 
How much time should a police officer take before she fires her weapon? 
Perhaps officers wait the ideal amount of time before shooting white 
suspects, but that conclusion is not apparent from the shooter bias studies 
themselves. It could be the case that officers shoot white Americans too 
slowly, which increases the likelihood that a suspect will successfully fire 
his weapon.223 Indeed, recall that participants in one of Eberhardt and 
colleagues’ study were slower to identify weapons after seeing a white face, 
compared not just to seeing a black face, but to a control group that saw no 
face.224 In other words, the implicit disassociation between white Americans 
and weapons might lead officers to respond too slowly in the face of 
imminent danger in the same way that it might lead officers to respond too 
quickly when the suspect is black.  
 
C.  Implicit Favoritism and Juries 
 
The American legal system asks jurors to speak for the community with 
the verdicts that they return in criminal cases. In placing such trust in juries, 
the system hopes and assumes that jury decisions can be made without 
interfering racial bias, either explicit or implicit. Yet, as we detailed in 
Section I, research has shown that implicit bias can function in a range of 
troubling ways during jury decision-making. This prior research, however, 
has focused primarily on implicit out-group derogation. Here, we discuss 
how evidence of implicit favoritism should independently generate concern 
for scholars interested in ensuring an unbiased jury process.  
 
 One of the gravest determinations a juror may ever have to make is 
deciding whether or not to sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life 
without the possibility of parole.225 In order to ensure that the jury has the 
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information it needs to render this solemn judgment, the Supreme Court 
held in Miller v. Alabama that jurors must consider the background and 
characteristics of the offender to determine whether this particular 
defendant is “the [typical] juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, [or] the rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”226 In other words, jurors are asked to 
decide whether the crime reflects the offender’s disposition or instead is 
attributable to situational factors such as juvenile status. 
 
Consider how implicit white favoritism can shape the decisions of jurors 
sitting in judgment of juveniles facing life without the possibility of parole 
and beyond. In Part II, we detailed evidence and studies supporting the 
Ultimate Attribution Error, the tendency to attribute the positive behaviors 
of in-group members as dispositional and negative behaviors as 
situational.227 Although the evidence for automatic in-group favoritism in 
the attribution realm is strong generally, the strongest findings in this line of 
research apply squarely to the juvenile homicide context. These findings 
demonstrate that people, here jurors, are especially likely to engage in in-
group “protective strategies” when an in-group member (which means 
white Americans in most locations228) has done something bad. These 
protective strategies protect the favored position of the entire in-group by 
leading people to explain away the fellow in-group member’s bad action as 
situational (or in the words of the Court, “unfortunate” and “transient”) 
rather than dispositional (deemed by the Court as “irreparable 
corruption”).229 Returning to the hypothetical, it becomes clear that the core 
determination made by jurors in a juvenile homicide case has been placed 
squarely within the domain of the Ultimate Attribution Error, and 
specifically its in-group favoritism domain. One could thus predict that 
white jurors will be automatically compelled by this favoritism-linked 
phenomenon to attribute a juvenile homicide to just the kind of unfortunate 
and transient characteristics the Court contemplated when it created a 
pathway to relative leniency for juvenile homicide offenders.    
 
Such in-group favoritism attribution errors are, of course, not limited to 
the homicide context. Imagine a 14 year-old boy who committed a string of 
armed robberies. The defense asks the jury to consider the fact that his 
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client has been addicted to “pills” since age twelve. The teenager told the 
jury that he committed the robberies in order to get enough money to score 
more drugs because his mom and dad did not want him to have an 
afterschool job. Is this 14 year-old teenager a rotten apple, or is his 
addiction driving the criminal behavior? Race clearly should be an 
irrelevant consideration. Yet, the ultimate attribution error suggests that 
jurors will be more likely to attribute the teenager’s bad deeds to situational 
factors—i.e. his addiction—and not to dispositional factors—i.e. this teen is 
a born criminal—if the teen is white.230 These examples of the role of 
automatic attribution errors could easily continue, and although they are 
powerfully illustrated within the juvenile context, there is no reason to 
believe that they are limited as such. Indeed, the research on attribution 
errors and its accompanying implicit favoritism could be applied to a wide 
range of crimes. 
 
D.  Implicit Favoritism and Legal Professionals 
 
Prosecutors exercise vast discretion in their decisions to charge and 
bargain.231 Studies routinely find that prosecutors exercise this discretion in 
racially biased ways. Consider the context punishment, and specifically the 
decisions of whether to charge a case capitally, and, if so, whether to 
consider a life without the possibility of parole sentence if the defendant 
pleads guilty. Prosecutors are most likely to pursue a death sentence when 
the victim is white.232 Implicit favoritism helps to explain how this race of 
the victim effect emerged.  
 
Recall that Levinson and colleagues designed a “value of life” IAT that 
measured implicit associations between race and worth.233 As hypothesized, 
Americans more quickly associated words that connote value—e.g. worth—
with white and words that connote a lack of value—e.g. worthless—with 
black.234 Implicitly connoting white Americans with value can skew 
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prosecutors’ judgments of how harmful they perceive a crime to be. 
Moreover, these racially skewed worth judgments can be intertwined with 
other mechanisms of implicit white bias such as empathy favoritism. For 
instance, if the victim is a white woman with light skin and stereotypically 
white features, she might be easier for white prosecutors to imagine as a 
friend, a sister, or a daughter than if the victim is a black woman with dark 
skin and Afrocentric features. Being able to identify with the victim 
increases empathy and thus elevates the likelihood that the prosecutor will 
more fully comprehend and feel the harm that has been bestowed on the 
deceased and her friends and family. This harm evaluation, colored as it is 
by disparate applications of empathy and worth assessment, can greatly 
influence whether a prosecutor decided to pursue capital charges and, if so, 
proceed to trial.  
 
But the opportunity for implicit favoritism to operate in the criminal 
justice system does not start and end with prosecutors. Public defenders, 
too, can propagate favoritism-based inequality. Does a client’s race 
influence the quality of representation that she receives? We discussed 
earlier that capital defense lawyers demonstrate the same implicit white 
over black bias on the IAT that the general population exhibits.235 We also 
discussed the argument made by Richardson and Goff that implicit negative 
stereotyping can impact how overburdened public defenders “triage” their 
cases. One approach to “triaging” an overwhelming caseload is to devote 
disproportionate attention to cases in which the lawyer believes that 
defendant might be factually innocent.236 Richardson and Goff cautioned 
against using the defender’s perception of innocence to prioritize cases. 
They assert that because defenders do not have adequate time or 
information to sort cases by guilt or innocence, defenders can only sort 
based on “speculative hunches.” Richardson and Goff worry that implicit 
racial bias “thrives” under such conditions and that negative stereotyping 
could unwittingly filter into the defender’s guilt-innocence determination.  
 
Implicit favoritism can also influence an assessment of guilt or 
innocence under conditions of constrained time and information. Consider a 
public defender trying to decide which of two cases to prioritize. Both cases 
involve assault charges. Case One involves a black victim and a white 
defendant. The black victim claims that the white defendant became visibly 
agitated during a heated conversation and then punched the victim in the 
side of the head. The white defendant claims that during the conversation 
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the black “victim” became angry and threw a punch at him. The white 
defendant punched back in self-defense. There are no witnesses. Case Two 
is identical except that the defendant is black and the victim is white. Would 
the public defender rank the white defendant case as more plausibly an 
innocence case? Recall that white Americans are dissociated with the 
concept of crime. White Americans also are stereotyped as law-abiding and 
peaceful. As the public defender sits in an interview room with his client, if 
the white defendant serve as a positive racial prime it might allow the 
defense lawyer to more easily belief his clients story that the black victim 
threw the first punch. The white defendant also could benefit if his public 
defender is white. Research on implicit racial bias and determinations of 






Implicit racial bias is a tool for understanding racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system. Legal scholars capitalizing on the availability of 
this tool have mostly used it at half strength. This is not to imply that 
research on how implicit racial bias as outgroup derogation has not been 
important. To the contrary, explanations for how implicit negative 
stereotyping of Black Americans influences the way that legislators, police 
officers, jurors and legal professionals make decisions has illustrated that 
racial factors are pervasive in criminal justice even if those who inject them 
do so unintentionally. Yet, the picture created by the implicit racial bias as 
outgroup derogation model is necessarily an incomplete one. To provide a 
more behaviorally rich portrait, as well as to contribute to understanding of 
racial disparities to which the outgroup derogation model cannot speak, this 
Article provided the first systemic account of implicit favoritism and its role 
in perpetuating disparities in the criminal justice system. We explained the 
multiple ways in which implicit favoritism operates—e.g. through priming, 
through bias in explaining why an event occurred, through enhanced in-
group empathy—to give the reader a sense that implicit favoritism is an 
umbrella term that applies to a variety of mechanisms—all of which operate 
without conscious intention. We then illustrated how implicit favoritism can 
operate in the criminal justice system by focusing on how it can impact the 
discretionary decisions of legislators, police officers, jurors and legal 
professionals. This importation of implicit favoritism into the legal 
literature on racial disparities in criminal justice means that we now have a 
more behaviorally accurate understanding of how racial disparities are 
perpetuated; a better sense of the magnitude of the problem; and an 
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understanding that scholars will need to address how we might curb 
favoritism—as well as derogation—if we hope to achieve a racially fair 
criminal justice system.  
 
 
 
 
